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The Cruel War: Social
Security Abuse in Canada
Reuben Hasson *

The Persistent and Universal Search
for Social Security Abuse
Allegations of abuse in the social security field have
become a permanent feature of debates about social
policy in Canada, as well as in the United States', the
United Kingdom 2 and Australia.'
There are certain features about the allegations of
wide-spread abuse that are striking. In the first place,
they are totally unsupported by evidence. Thus, when in
1976 in British Columbia Mr. William Vander Zalm
instituted the Ministry Inspectors Program (known generally as the 'fraud squad'), he estimated that there were
more than $40-$50 million lost through welfare fraud
each year. The figures were, in fact, nowhere near that
magnitude and the most that can be said is that the programme eventually came close to paying for itself

Provincial Working Party on Income Maintenance
noted that many Canadians were not obtaining the
social security benefits to which they were entitled. 6 The
authors of the review attributed this failure to claim
benefits to "the stigma attached to social assistance
(associated on the one hand with the discretionary
powers held by local welfare authorities, and on the
other, with the public perception of persons 'living off
welfare.')" Although stigma may be the main factor inhibiting people from claiming their welfare benefits, ignorance of benefits available cannot be ignored as a factor in a country in which it has been estimated that there
are "80 separate and separately administered programs
to provide income to those in need."' Apart from those
who do not get benefits at all, there are a large number

* Reuben Hasson is a professor of law at Osgoode

Hall Law School.

[C]omplaints about welfare abuse serve
to conceal vast areas of welfare law and
administration from critical scrutiny
since these areas are never mentioned by
those who allege rampant welfare abuse.
through recoveries agreed to, as well as moneys saved by
terminating existing benefits. 4 To be sure, Mr. Vander
Zalm's is the most egregious example of an overestimate
but the important point is that no single allegation of
widespread social security abuse has been documented
in Canada.
The second feature of the social security abuse allegations is that they give no indication of the fact that the
number of people who do not claim benefits may be
greater than the number of claimants who are defrauding the welfare system. Thus, in the United
Kingdom Mr. David Donnison, then chairman of the
Supplementary Benefits Commission, estimated in 1976
that twenty-five per cent of people entitled to welfare
benefits were not claiming them.' In 1975, the Federal
114
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For a concise description of the American and Canadian 'wars
on welfare fraud' see C. Leman, The Collapse of Welfare
Reform: Political Institutions, Policy and the Poor in Canada
and the United States (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1980), pp.
208-10.
See, e.g., Report of the Royal Committee on the Abuse of Social
Security Benefits (Fisher Report), Cmnd. 5228 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1973) and more recently, Payment of Benefits to
Unemployed People (Rayner Report) (London: Department of
Health and Social Security, 1981).
See the provocative essay by Bright, "Dole Blunders or Tax
Dodgers: Who is the Deviant?," in P. Wilson and J. Braithwaite,
eds., The Two Faces of Deviance (Brisbane: University of
Queensland Press, 1978), p. 161.
See Leman, supra note 1, p. 209.
See speech by D. Donnison, "Policies and Priorities for Supplementary Benefits," to the London Branch of the British Institute of Management on November 16, 1976, p. 11 (mimeo)
(copy available from author).
Federal Provincial Working Party on Income Maintenance,
Background Paper on Income Support and Supplementation
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), p. 13.
Id., p. 7.
See statement by Mr. Ross McLellan, N.D.P. member for
Bellwoods, in Ont., Standing Committee on Social Development, Proceedings (October 31, 1979), p. 13.
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of welfare claimants who receive wrongly calculated
benefits. In the United States, twenty five per cent of all
Aid to Families with Dependent Children cases involve
mistaken payments 9 and, while Canadian figures are
not available, it would not be surprising - given the
complexity of Canadian Welfare programmes - if the
same margin of error prevailed here. Even if most of the
mistaken payments were in favour of claimants, this is
of little consequence since, as will be seen, Canadian
social security law offers very little protection against
mistaken payments.
The third feature of much of the 'anti-scrounger'
allegations is that it often uses 'abuse' in a highly
idiosyncratic manner. Thus, to receive a social security
overpayment is regarded as an abuse despite the fact
that the general law of the land provides that someone
who receives a mistaken payment in good faith and
spends it is not obliged to make restitution.10 Again, it is
regarded as an abuse by many that injured workers
should get overlapping benefits under workers' compensation schemes,'' whereas in the general law of tort
overlapping payments are regarded by the legal system
with equanimity.
Finally, a disturbing feature of the behaviour of
politicians and propagandists who allege that social
security abuse is endemic is that they fail to generate the
same or indeed any concern about tax evasion.' 2 This is
so despite the fact that the sums estimated lost through
tax evasion - $3 billion' per annum - are far in excess
of even the most extravagant estimates of all moneys
lost through all social security schemes as a result of
fraud. Yet, at a time when all levels of government were
appointing more people to control social security
abuse,1 4 the percentage of income tax returns audited
decreased from 0.93 per cent in 1971 to 0.62 per cent in
1976.11 In the field of corporate audits, the number
went down between 1974 and 1979 from 6.5 per cent to
4.6 per cent. 1 6 This occurred despite the fact that corporate schemes for the evasion of tax became more sophisticated and despite the fact that Mr. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Minister, Taxation, Department of National Revenue, stated, "Our expected minimum intake
from spending a dollar on auditing tax returns is to get
$3 back."' 7

How Much Welfare Abuse?
While allegations of widespread welfare abuse are
unsupported, it must be conceded that some welfare
abuse does take place. The difficulties in measuring its
extent are fraught with formidable difficulties.
First, there is no consensus as to what constitutes
abuse. For example, as pointed out above, there is no
agreement as to how to view overlapping benefits in accident compensation schemes. Similarly, there is no
consensus as to how much unemployed people and
people on welfare ought to be allowed to earn by way of
part-time earnings. Indeed, it would be correct to say
that most of the rules in the social security system have
been (and still are) the subject of vigorous

controversy. 8
Second, assuming that definitions of abuse could
be agreed upon, another difficulty in this field is simply
that of measuring the extent of abuse. This difficulty
frustrated even the British Royal Committee on the
Abuse of Social Security Benefits (FisherCommittee). '9

M. Bendick et al., The Anatomy of A.F.D.C. Errors
(Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1978), p. 55; Richardson,
"Fraud", in Department of the U.S. House Committee on
Government Operations, Administration of the A.F.D.C. Program, 95th Congress, Ist. Session (April 1977), part 8, pp.
255-258, quoted in C. Leman, supra note 1, p. 208. Professor
David Donnison has pointed out, supra note 5, p. I1, that
... every study of errors shows that claimants are more likely to
get less than they are entitled to than more." The reason for this
is that while virtually every social insurance scheme will have a
mechanism to monitor overpayments, very few indeed will have
mechanisms to safeguard against underpayment.
10. See Rural Municipality of Shorthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 147, (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
11. See e.g., the views expressed in The Wyatt Group (Wyatt Report)
(Toronto, 1978) and in P.C. Weiler, Reshaping Workers' Compensation in Ontario (Weiler Report) (Ont. Minister of Labour:
Toronto, 1980). These views have been adopted by the Ont.
Ministry of Labour, White Paper on the Reform of Workers'
Compensation (Toronto, 1981).
12. See Bright, supra note 3; F. Field, M. Meacher and C. Pond, To
Him Who Hath: A Study of Poverty and Taxation (Hammondsworth: Penquin Books, 1977), ch. 8; Hasson, "Tax Evasion and
Social Security Abuse - Some Tentative Observations," 2 Canadian Taxation 82,83 (1980) where it is estimated that the tax gap
is about 10 per cent of reported taxes. In 1977-78 the reported
taxes came to about $31.5 billion. The National Finances: An
Analysis of the Revenues and Expenditures of the Government
of Canada1980-81 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981),
Table 2-13, Consolidated Government Gross General Revenue
1977-78, p. 33.
14. Even a small municipality the size of Durham in Ontario has
thought it necessary to appoint a full-time welfare fraud official.
According to a story in the Toronto Star, July 17, 1981 this individual has saved Durham region taxpayers $248,000.00 in his
first year, a sum equal to 11 times his salary. This kind of return
might persuade other municipalities to adopt similar courses of
action.
15. The figures are as follows:
9.

Number

Year
of Audits
Tax Collected
1971
88,743
$155,879,000
1972
90,025
$253,240,000
1973
N/A
N/A
1974
81,119
$240,867,689
1975
66,604
$229,444,387
1976
78,700
$327,901,000
Source: Revenue Canada, Taxation, Inside Taxation (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1971-1976).
16. See statement by Mr. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Minister Taxation, Department of National Revenue in Can., H. of C. Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, Proceedings, No. 10 (Nov. 13, 1971), p. 36.
17. Id, p. 37.
18. In this connection, the comments of Professor David Donnison,
supra note 5, are particularly relevant: "When I hear people talking about abuses, I usually find when I dig into the abuse that
they are talking about a payment to which someone is fully entitled by law - but they do not think he ought to get it."
19. Supra note 2.
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After hearing evidence from government departments,
social work agencies, Members of Parliament and
anyone who had an interest in the subject the Committee concluded:
It would be very desirable, if it were possible, to know exactly how much abuse of the social security system by
wrongful claims actually goes on. So long as knowledge of
the full extent of abuse is incomplete and fragmentary, any
judgment as to how serious a problem it is and what
resources it is justifiable to devote to alternative means of
suppressing it must be based on impression and
guesswork.2 0

The difficulty in estimating the extent and cost of
welfare abuse is greater in a federal country such as
Canada than in a unitary country as the United Kingdom. Whereas social security is centrally administered
in the United Kingdom, the administration of social
welfare in Canada is divided between federal, provincial
and municipal governments in a 'scheme' of frightening
complexity. 2 1

[A] disturbing feature of the behaviour
of politicians and propagandists who
allege that social security abuse is
endemic is that they fail to generate the
same or indeed any concern about tax
evasion
Third, difficulty arises in not knowing what use to
make of figures relating to criminal prosecutions in the
field of security abuse. On one extreme, criminal convictions may indicate the full extent of the social security agency's efforts in combating abuse. At the other extreme, criminal prosecutions may tell us next to nothing
about an agency's efforts in attempting to combat
abuse, since although very few prosecutions may be
brought the agency may penalize social security recipients either by wrongfully denying their claims in the
first place or else by terminating their benefits wrongfully. 22 It is extremely important to note that the denial of
benefits to a claimant may be more financially severe
than a fine or a prison sentence and that this method of
controlling abuse is attractive to many administrators
since it is cheaper and easier to administer. Even if
social security decisions were published - and for the
most part they are not2 3 - there would still be no way
of telling how many people who rightfully claim welfare
benefits are denied them.
Even though there are these uncertainties about the
basic facts and the fundamental question of what constitutes abuse, it is my contention that there is very little
opportunity for social security recipients to commit
social security abuse.
Indeed, the major problem in the social security
system is that the social security recipient is all too often
abused by harsh and atavistic rules or is abused by receiving inadequate benefits.
116

In order to illustrate these points, I shall examine
three areas of social security: Workers' Compensation,
Unemployment Insurance and Welfare.

PART I
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
It is doubtful if any subject of Canadian public
policy has been more exhaustively examined than workers' compensation. In Ontario alone, there have been
three Royal Commission reports,2 4 one task force inquiry, 25 a review by a group of pension consultants, 26
and an inquiry by a noted academic.27 In no single
review of the provincial Acts that I am aware of has the
problem of false claims been regarded as being of any
great significance. The Ontario figures for cases referred to the prosecuting authorities in respect of fraudulent claims during the past five years indicate that the
problem is an extremely modest one.
20. Id., p. 209, para. 446. The Committee did recommend that the
Department of Social Security carry out a random survey of
those receiving benefits. The Minister of the day objected that a
random survey of this sort would cause offence to the many innocent people who would inevitably be selected.
21. For an introduction to our chaotic 'scheme' of benefits see J.C.
Brown, A Hit-and-Miss Affair: Policies for Disabled People in
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Council for Social Development,
1977).
22. Thus, in the United Kingdom in 1974, 2,335 cases were investigated for fictitious desertion and 9,993 cases for undisclosed
cohabitation. The investigations resulted in 45 per cent and 41
per cent respectively of allowances being reduced or withdrawn
for each group of claimants investigated, see figures cited in
Field et al., supra note 12, p. 153. Clearly the cut-off of benefits
is the more dominate method of dealing with suspected fraud,
as opposed to, say, criminal prosecutions.
23. Even those decisions which are reported are so inadequate that
the claimant cannot make any kind of intelligent decision as to
whether he or she wants to appeal. The point has been well put
by Professor Ison when commenting on decisions of the Ontario
Workmen's Compensation Board. Ison says of these decisions,
"They are simply a brief recital of some of the evidence followed
by a decree. They do not state what principles are being applied,
or how these principles are derived nor do they portray in any
other way any movement of the mind from premise to conclusion" Ison, "Contemporary Developments and Reform in Personal Injury Compensation in New Developments in the Law of
Torts," in Law Society of Canada Special Lectures (Toronto:
Richard De Boo, 1973), pp. 521, 547. The decisions of the Ontario Social Assistance Review Board are at least as incomprehensible as those of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation
Board.
24. See Report of The Royal Commission in the Matter of The
Workmen's Compensation Act (McGillivray Report) (Toronto,
1967); Report of the Commissioner In the Matter of The
Workmen's Compensation Act (Middleton Report) (Toronto:
King's Printer 1932), Report on The Workmen's Compensation
Act (Roach Report) (Toronto: King's Printer, 1950).
25. Ontario Task Force on Workmen's Compensation, The Administration of Workmen's Compensation in Ontario (Toronto,
1973).
26. See the Wyatt Report, supra note 11. For a critique of this
Report see Hasson, "The Wyatt Report on Workmen's Compensation - A Nightmare," 1 Low Income Law (No. 3) 18 (1980).
27. See the Weiler Report, supra note 11.
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981
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TABLE I
Ontario Workers' Compensation Cases of Fraudulent Claims
New Cases

Cases Carried Over

0
10
2
5
1978
4
3
1979
2
2
1980
1
4
1981
Source: Information supplied by letter from Mr. W.R. Riddell,
Workmen's Compensation Board, Solicitor and General
Counsel, to the author, dated May 7, 1981.
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I think that the reason why there is so little abuse is
that it is very difficult to pass off an injury that occurred, say, at home, as being one that occurred at work. 28
Occasionally, perhaps, a claimant is able to persuade a
board that a non-work-caused injury occurred at work,
but - and this illustrates my point about the difficulty
of defining at least serious abuse - in the very rare case
where a claimant is able to obtain workers' compensation benefits for an accident that occurred outside the
factory gate, I am afraid that I am unable to feel any
great sense of outrage. For the purpose of a rational
compensation scheme it is impossible to justify, either
on policy grounds or in terms of ethics, discrimination
between those persons who suffer injuries at the work
place and those who suffer them elsewhere.
On a number of occasions, business groups have
asserted that the provisions of the workers' compensation Acts have been construed too liberally in favour of
injured victims. Thus, some employers told the Weiler
Committee on workers' compensation that "there was a
systemic bias in favor of granting claims, even unjustified ones." 2 9 Such allegations are unsupported by
even a single example. The scanty evidence we have scanty because only one province has a developed reporting service3 0 - indicates that the Boards are not
overly generous in compensating for traumatic injuries.
Consider, for example, the four following Ontario
cases." In the first case, a wood lathe operator injured
his hand while turning a piece of wood for his personal
use. In the second case, an employee injured his eye
while lighting a cigarette while on his way to the
washroom. In both these cases, the Board felt that under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act 3 2
the claimant was not entitled to receive protection for
acts done on their own behalf while at work.
These cases should be contrasted with the case of
an employee who suffered a lumbar strain when picking
up a can of cola from a dispensing machine located in
the canteen. In another case, an employee was injured
as she was re-entering the factory gates after returning
from a dental appointment. In both these latter cases,
the employees were held to be entitled to compensation
because they were acting within the scope of their
employment.
It seems to me that the theory which allowed the
claimants in the last two cases to recover, that is, that an
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

accident which occurs on the employer's premises is one
that arises out of employment, should have been applied
to allow recovery in the first two cases. 33
However, the fate of the traumatically injured victim is more favourable than someone disabled by disease in the work place. "Accidents, poisonings and
violence" accounted for only 24.4 per cent of the deaths
of persons aged between 20 - 60 in 1974. Disease accounted for 75.6 per cent of the deaths.3 4 However,
when workers' compensation figures for the Alberta,
British Columbia and Manitoba Boards are examined,
only between 2 and 17 per cent of awards were made in
respect of death from disease." Of the total number of
permanent disability awards only 3.4 to 11.3 per cent
were awarded in respect of disease, and of these, the
majority were for hearing loss. If claims for hearing loss
are excluded, only 0.8 to 1.7 per cent of the total
number of permanent disability awards were for
disease. 3 6 Workers might be excused for thinking that
the Workmen's Compensation Act should be renamed
the Workmen's Compensation (Trauma) Act.
There are three additional problems that work accident and disease victims face. First, the Boards have
generally accorded a more generous recognition to visible anatomical loss in awarding partial and permanent
disability benefits than to the degree of impairment or
economic loss. As Professor Ison has pointed out, "it is
common to find permanent disability awards ranging
from 40 to 70% for the loss of a limb, even though the
actual wage loss may be negligible. But for a herniated
disc treated by laminectomy and fusion, awards have
commonly been about 5 to 10% of total disability, notwithstanding that actual wage loss may be 50% or
higher."3 7 The physical impairment method of compen28.

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

34.

35.
36.
37.

Even the most liberal workers' compensation board in the country has set out fairly stringent criteria for determining whether
accidents are work-related or not. See, for example, decision No.
145 of the British Columbia Workers' Compensation Board
dated October 3, 1975.
See the Weiler Report, supra note 11, p. 95.
British Columbia.
These examples are from Reed, "Workmen's Compensation in
Ontario," in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures:
Employment Law (Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1976), pp. 110-12.
Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, C.539.
This should not be taken to mean that the fact that a worker is
injured off the work premises determines a priori that the injury
did not arise in the course of the employment. See, e.g., Decision
No. 2 of the British Columbia Workers' Compensation Board
dated June 4, 1973 where the worker was granted compensation
when he was hit by a passing motor vehicle after he had cashed
his pay cheque.
Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Canada Year
Book: 1976-77 Special Edition (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1978),
pp. 175, 202-03.
See T. Ison, The Dimensions of IndustrialDisease(Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1978), p. 1.
Id.
See Ison, "Information Access and the Workmen's Compensation Board," Research Publication 4 (Toronto: Commission on
Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy, Jan. 1979), p.
64.
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sating for permanent disabilities certainly leaves a large
proportion, if not the majority, of claimants who do actually receive awards under-compensated. 3 8
Second, even if the awards were originally adequate
or generous, in three provinces the awards will soon
become inadequate because of the failure of the provincial governments to inflation-proof these benefits. 9
Third, because the workers' compensation Acts are
limited to work-related accidents and diseases, there are
numerous contested cases. For example, is the worker's
asthma caused by poor ventilating conditions at work or
is the illness the result of non-work-related causes? 4 0
Or, is the claimant's back injury the result of a traumatic event or is it the result of the process of aging?
Disputes such as these, combined with the facts that
boards either do not make interim payments or limit
them to very exceptional circumstances, cause delays in
payment which create nightmarish difficulties for
thousands of claimants. 4 '
In short, there is "no systemic bias" in favour of
claimants. The workers' compensation system has too
many affinities with the justly discredited negligence
system for it to be regarded as a just and effective
system of compensation.

[O]ver-compensation of accident victims
in tort actions is generally regarded with
equanimity and, sometimes, with
positive enthusiasm
In recent years, some commentators have focussed
their attention on what they perceive to be an abuse in
the system of workers' compensation. That abuse may
be described as the problem of overlapping benefits or
over-compensation of workers. 4 2 Thus, in December
1979, the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board
pointed out in its Grey Paper 43 that as a result of some
workers obtaining Canada Pension Plan benefits, disability insurance and wage loss plans, in addition to their
workers' compensation benefits, some workers might be
financially better off while injured than while working.
There is a great failure to understand that overcompensation is extremely unlikely to occur in other
than a very small minority of cases. In the first place,
many workers are adversely affected by ceilings which
are entirely anachronistic and which penalize higherpaid workers. 4 4 Second, as has been pointed out earlier,
there is little attempt to match the degree of disability
with the amount of economic loss sustained. 4 5 Third, in
three provinces benefits are not made inflation-proof.46
If ceilings were removed, realistic pensions were paid
and benefits indexed to inflation, it is difficult to envisage workers purchasing expensive disability insurance and wage loss plans. It is even difficult to imagine that very many workers would pursue their Canadian Pension Plan benefits since the criteria for obtaining these benefits are extremely difficult to meet. 4 7 In
118

short, an attack on the problem of over-compensation is
a thoroughly ill-advised one at the present time since
many people who appear to be over-compensated are, in
fact, under-compensated.
It is impossible to leave the subject of over-compensation without mentioning that, in the field of personal injury litigation, over-compensation of accident
victims in tort actions is generally regarded with
equanimity and, sometimes, with positive enthusiasm.
Not only are accident victims awarded substantial sums
for pain and suffering4 8 and for loss of amenities, but
tort accident victims are not required to deduct from
their awards either private insurance benefits, 4 9 unemployment insurance benefits, 0 Canada Pension Plan
Benefits,' wage payments by the employer5 2 or any

38.

There is a recognition of this fact in the existence of sections such
as subsection 42(5) of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation
Act which allows supplements to be paid to workers who would
be seriously under-compensated if the physical impairment
method were used. Unfortunately, this section has been hedged
around by numerous restrictions.
39. The provinces are Alberta, New Brunswick and Ontario.
40. See the celebrated decision in the case of Mrs. Murdeena
Johnson where the claimant was successful in arguing that her
asthma was caused by poor ventilating conditions. The decision
was hailed as a breakthrough in the Toronto Globe and Mail,
February 3, 1979, pp. 1-2, but the Board said the case "is a unique
case with unusual circumstances and will probably never crop up
again," Globe and Mail, February 6, 1979, p. 6.
41. The Weiler Report, supra note 11, does not appear to have
grasped the importance of delays in the workmen's compensation system. Had it done so, it is possible that the Report would
have recommended a system of interim payments.
42. See the authorities cited supra note 11.
43. Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board, Current Concerns in
Workmen's Compensation, mimeo (Toronto, December 1979).
44. The ceilings are as follows:
Alberta
$18,250
British Columbia
22,200
Manitoba
18,000
New Brunswick
18,000
Newfoundland
18,000
Nova Scotia
15,000
Ontario
18,500
Prince Edward Island
12,000
Quebec
23,500
Saskatchewan
22,000
45. See text at supra note 37.
46. See supra note 39.
47. See, e.g. Minister of Health and Welfare v. Cauchi, 2 Canadian
Employment Benefits and Pension Guide Reports (1978), para.
8546, pp. 20.12, where the claimant was not entitled to compensation despite suffering from asbestosis.
48. See the award of $100,000 for pain and suffering and loss of
amenities awarded by the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews
v. Grand& Toy (Alberta) Ltd. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452, 491.
It would be fair to say that this sum is regarded as being extremely (or excessively) moderate by commentators and practitioners.
49. See, e.g., Parry v. Cleaver, [1970] A.C. I (H.L.).
50. See Boarelli v. Flannigan (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 4 (Ont. C.A.).
51. See, e.g., CanadianPacificLtd. v. Gill(1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 90
(Man. Q.B.).
52. See, e.g., Harris v. Manchester (1975), 50 D.L.R. (3d) 90 (Man.
Q.B.).
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THE CRUEL WAR

other collateral benefit." Any attempt to change the
collateral benefits principle in this area would provoke
the wrath of most lawyers. Ironically, most of these
lawyers would applaud the principle that there should
be no overlapping benefits in workers' compensation
cases.
Another example of the double standard that operates in this area of the law is to be found in the activities
of occupational health consultants who advise
employers on how to resist workers' compensation
claims. Thus, recently, a Dr. Richman who advises for
British Petroleum, Canadian General Electric and St.
Lawrence Cement, was speaking at a conference seminar on employee-employer-doctor problems in communications. 5 4 Among the advice that Dr. Richman
gave employers was that if they wanted to defeat an
employee's compensation claim which they felt was "not
valid," they should not fill in the WCB form properly.
"Leave out the social insurance number; then it won't go
into the computer," he said."5 Alternatively, Dr.

[S]ome employers seem prepared to
receive instruction in how to use
unethical tactics to resist workers' claims
Richman also advised the conference that if employers
believed an injury did not really occur at work, they
should give the employee a letter with that information
to take to his family doctor. The advantage to the
employer of doing this is that this might discourage the
doctor from putting through a compensation claim with
the compensation board.5 6 Finally, the speaker advised
company officials to leave the WCB form deliberately
vague if they felt the claim being applied for was not
valid. They should answer "yes" or "no" questions with
question marks. The presence of question marks might
well lead to an investigation. In short, in disputed cases
the object should be "to make the form as hard for them
to follow as possible"." Amazingly, this sort of advice
seems to be regarded as a legitimate exercise of a professional calling. It is impossible to believe that if a trade
union official or a community legal worker told claimants to exaggerate their injuries because the benefits
paid were too low or else told them to fudge facts which
might show that the accident was not work-related this
would be regarded as being ethically acceptable.

Conclusion
There seems to be very little fraud in the workers'
compensation system. Further, to assert as many business groups have done that the injured victim is the darling of the provincial workers' compensation schemes is
equally without any support. What evidence there is indicates that a very large number of workers' compensation claims become nightmares for the people who bring
them because the boards all too often interpret the acts
in the narrowest possible fashion.
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

The problem of overlapping compensation turns
out, on examination, to be a problem of insignificant
proportions. Finally, some employers seem prepared to
receive instruction in how to use unethical tactics to
resist workers' claims.

[TJo the extent that payment of benefits
would help strikers, the denial of benefits
helps the employer. Since there can be no
neutral position, the real question is why
the government should choose to be
neutral on the side of the employer.
It seems impossible to resist the conclusion that the
debate over abuse is really a fight over the adequacy of
benefits. Increased benefits are seen by employers and
by pension consultants as likely to promote fraudulent
claims and malingering on the part of claimants. Thus,
after the Weiler Report recommended marginal changes
in workers' compensation," the benefit consulting firm
William M. Mercer of Toronto, stated, "We feel all Ontario citizens should be alarmed by the omission of
safeguards to prevent unjustified claims and undue duration of benefits."5 9 Then, as if aware that improved
benefits might not cause increase fraud or malingering,
the company stated that further research was needed
and such research might show "that as a society we cannot afford the luxury of one of the world's most generous compensation systems ."60 Thus, a generous
workers' compensation scheme would be undesirable an abuse - from the Company's point of view. On the
other hand, a workers' compensation system of the present kind is unacceptable - perhaps one might use the
word 'abusive' - for the workforce subject to the
system.
At the end of the day, the charges of abuse seem to
evaporate, and the question becomes one of how comprehensive and generous we believe our workers' compensation schemes to be.

53. The one exception to this principle is to be found in the various
provincial no-fault road accident benefits; see, for example, The
InsuranceAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, s. 232.
54. See the report in the Hamilton Spectator, September 29, 1979.
55.

Id.

56.
57.

Id.
Id. Note also the comments of Lloyd Sataryn who observes: "Industry doctors and scientists often act as hired guns shooting
down evidence that a product or process is potentially dangerous
to human health." L. Sataryn, Dying For a Living (Toronto:
Deneau and Greenberg, 1979), p. 182.
See supra note 11. It is an open question whether these marginal
changes will benefit or disadvantage workers.
W.M. Mercer Ltd., Special Bulletin, mimeo (Toronto: December 29, 1980), p. 3.
Id., p. 4.

58.
59.
60.
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PART II
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
There is some evidence that many Canadians
believe that the Unemployment InsuranceAct6l is being
abused by claimants. A review sponsored by the Unemployment Insurance Commission in 1977 found that "71
per cent of Canadians felt that the U.I. programme
should be tightened up." 6 2 In February 1978, the Toronto Globe and Mail reported that 84 per cent of Canadians thought that the Act needed to be tightened up to
prevent abuse. 63 These results are not surprising considering that at the time these surveys were taken the
Federal Government was spending more than a million
dollars a year telling Canadians that abuse of the unemployment insurance system was a serious problem. 64
In my view the Act does not need tightening up
because it is being administered in a very unsympathetic
manner. It is necessary to divide the areas of alleged
abuse into separate categories.

Fraud
Penalties may be imposed either under section 47 or
section 121 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971
upon someone who wrongfully claims benefits and
upon people who make false statements. Section 47 imposes administrative penalties whereas section 121 imposes quasi-criminal penalties.6 5 The figures for the
number of penalties imposed in recent years are as
follows.

on the Abuse of Social Security Benefits found that 86
per cent of the prosecutions were for the failure to
report the receipt of earnings above the level
permitted.66 I am prepared to assume that most prosecutions in Canada are, similarly, for failure to report
outside earnings.
In assessing the moral culpability and therefore the
seriousness of the abuse committed by claimants who
fail to report outside earnings, I would like to make a
plea in mitigation and urge that the law be changed. As
the law stands at present, a claimant is entitled to earn a
sum equal to 25 per cent of his or her weekly benefits.
However, for every $1 earned above that amount, his or
her benefits are reduced by $1. This means that earnings
in excess of 25 per cent are taxed at a rate of 100 per
cent. If, as has been argued for so long, penal rates of
taxation encourage tax evasion, 67 then surely we ought
to be concerned about a system that imposes a rate of
taxation that is without parallel in the field of income
taxation. This is particularly true when it is appreciated
that many people receiving full employment benefits
plus another twenty-five per cent thereof would still be
living below any of the recognized poverty lines.68

The Problem of the Workshy
The problem of the workshy unemployment insurance claimant is one that has received extensive attention from politicians, the mass media and
academics. 69 The difficulty, however, is that, like

61.
62.

TABLE 2
Administrative Penalties and Prosecutions
under the Unemployment Insurance Act

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

No. of
Claims

No. of
S.47 Penalties

No. of S.121
Penalties

1,974,000
2,438,000
2,429,000
2,500,000
2,809,000

22,474
26,853
38,151
60,000
50,000

924
1,800
4,600
6,500
6,700

Source: Unemployment Insurance Commission, Annual Reports
(1974-79).

The total number of claimants subject to either
penalty or prosecution rose from 1.19 to 2.66 per cent in
1977. In 1978 this figure dropped to 2.01 per cent, but it
is clear that the last five years for which we have figures
have seen stricter control over claimants. In particular,
the number of people convicted has continued to grow
steadily.
The annual reports of the Unemployment Insurance Commission do not give any breakdown of how
many of these convictions and penalties are imposed for
failure to disclose earnings as opposed to say, incorrectly stating the number of jobs searched for, or merely
making false statements. The British Royal Committee
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63.

64.

65.

66.
67.

68.
69.

Unemployment InsuranceAct, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72 c. 48.
Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, "Comprehensive Review of the U.I. Program in Canada," in E. Rosen,
A Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Unemployment
Insurance Programin Canada(Ottawa: Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, 1977), pp. 1-4.
See the figures quoted in a letter to the editor by Mr. L.E. St.
Laurent, Executive Director of Benefits for the Canada Employment Commission in the Toronto Globe and Mail, February 18,
1978.
See the statement by the Hon. Bud Cullen, then Minister of
Employment and Immigration, in Can., H. of C. Debates,
January 23, 1978, p. 2301.
For section 47 see amended section in S.C. 1976-77, c. 54, s. 43.
A section 47 penalty is imposed where there are felt to be
"mitigating or extenuating circumstances", whereas a criminal
penalty is imposed when no such circumstances are felt to exist.
For a partial list of these 'extenuating circumstances' see P.
Issalys and S. Watkins, Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977), pp. 114-16.
The FisherReport, supra note 2, p. 227, para 492.
The argument that 'penal' rates of taxation encourage evasion
was advanced as early as 1922 in Bastable, Public Finance, 3rd.
ed., (1922), p. 310, quotes in Blum and Kalven, "The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation," 19 University of Chicago Law
Review 417, 444 fn. 80 (1952).
This might occur if the claimant had a low salary and numerous
dependents.
For a recent discussion see Professor D. Ham, Unemployment
Insurance and Work Effort.: Issues, Evidence and Policy Directions (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1981), bibliography
at pp. 30-34.
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abuse, 'workshyness' is a very subjective concept. Thus,
individuals who refuse a lower-paid and less prestigious
job would not regard themselves as being workshy, but
the Commission might take precisely that view and disqualify (and/or disentitle) them. The Unemployment
Insurance Act, 1971, subsection 40(3) requires a claimant, after a "reasonable interval", to lower her or his
sights in terms of the jobs that she or he is willing to accept. The problem, however, is that the claimants do
not know what constitutes a "reasonable interval" and
by how much their expectations must be lowered. According to the authors of a study prepared for the Law
Reform Commission, Unemployment Insurance Benefits, claimants in the first three weeks of unemployment
are entitled to regard as suitable only such jobs as are in
their own occupation and which pay their normal rate
of earnings. After this period, skilled workers with more
than one year's experience in their occupation receive an
extension of one week for every year of experience up to
a maximum of thirteen weeks. At the end of this time,
claimants must expand the scope of their search to include other occupations at a progressively lower rate of
earnings (five per cent less per week). An employee is
not, however, required to accept a job if the rate of pay
is lower than the prevailing wage for the particular occupation or if the conditions of employment are less
favourable than those observed by collective agreements
or recognized by good employers. 0
It is scandalous that this rule is unpublished, but
even more shocking is the fact that the Commission has
instructed its agents not to inform claimants to be particularly demanding in terms of a new job until the lapse
of the "reasonable interval". If the claimant questions
the agent regarding the length of the interval he is told
simply that it depends on the type of employment, the
experience of the claimant in his occupation and the
length of time on unemployment. No specific time limit
is mentioned. 7 ' As a result of this bizarre procedure, it

[W]hat appears to be taking place is the
cynical use of alleged abuse to justify cutting unemployment insurance costs.
is possible that a claimant will be disentitled from receiving unemployment insurance benefits even though
the claimant is actively seeking work. The difficulty is
that the claimant will have been seeking the 'wrong' kind
of work because there was no one to point that fact out
to the claimant. If such a practice existed in the field of
say, taxation law, there would, rightly, be outcries invoking the principle of the rule of law. Strangely, however, we seem to accept this bizarre denial of the principle in unemployment insurance law.
Beginning in the mid-70s, the government decided
that certain groups of workers were prone to workshyness. These workers were to be subjected to regular interviews. There was (and is) no statistical evidence that
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

these groups of workers were more likely to abuse the
unemployment insurance system than other groups of
workers. It was decided that the following claimants be
subjected to regular interviews:
1. All claimants in "demand" occupations, were to
be interviewed every three weeks.
2. All single males, between 14-24 years of age and
not in "demand" occupations were to be interviewed
every four weeks.
3. All married females not in "demand" occupations were to be interviewed every four weeks. 7 2
In April 1976, the list of target groups was revised.
After that date, the following groups of claimants were
to be exposed to one-on-one interviews wherever resources permitted with the order of priority being listed
as follows:
1. Occupations with "High Opportunities". These
are defined as occupations where ten or more contacts
are considered to be a minimum.
2. All males aged 14-24 who fall within "Low Opportunity" occupations. These are defined as occupations where less than ten contacts per week are considered to be a minimum.
3. All females, aged 18-20 who are in "Low Opportunity" occupations. These are defined as occupations
where less then ten contacts per week are considered a
minimum.
4. All "ethnic" claimants who do not fall within
any of the above criteria. They should be interviewed on
a one-to-one basis wherever resources allow. 73
The interviewing of these 'target' groups is performed by benefit control officers who are drawn from
the ranks of former policemen, private detectives and
investigators for commercial collection agencies. As the
authors of the report for the Law Reform Commission
of Canada point out "...these hiring practices may

create a risk that benefit control operations be occasionally tainted with the ethics and the (sometimes
strongly critisized) methods of private agencies." 7 4 In
another passage, they demonstrated that there was more
than a risk of these methods being used. In their words,
"Some of the ... interviewing techniques used by BCOs

have, however, come in for severe criticism. In its
November 1973 report, the Unemployment Insurance
Advisory Committee stated that in certain instances, the
BCOs made use of leading questions and subsequently
twisted the meaning of the replies by making them much
more categorical than they had actually been. The most
frequent shifts in meaning seemed to have occurred with
regard to the salary desired by the claimant, a point
about which it is quite possible that a claimant may
entertain more or less exaggerated hopes, but it is highly
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, c. 48 subsection
40(2).
See P_ Issalys and S. Watkins, supra note 65, pp. 54-55.
See Schwartzman, "How Dark is it in the Bowels of the Beast?"
This Magazine, May-June 1981, pp. 4, 6.
Id.
See P. Issalys and S. Watkins, supra note 65, p. 75.
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improbable that his demands will be absolutely uncompromising and immutable. On the basis of observations made by members of the Boards of referees the
Advisory Committee therefore disapproved of BCOs
asking, 'I suppose a minimum wage of $3.25 an hour
would suit you?' and after getting the reply 'yes, I'd like
to get that,' noting in their report that the claimant
demanded a minimum wage of $3.25 an hour"." From
the point of view of the benefit control officer concerned, an undeserving and possibly workshy claimant has
been denied benefit. To many observers, the claimant
has been declared ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because of an immoral trick.

The [UICI training guide does nothing to
encourage sympathetic or ethical attitudes towards claimants.
The training guide does nothing to encourage sympathetic or ethical attitudes towards claimants. This
guide includes the following statements:
5. Tell the truth. A bluff may occasionally be
justified; deliberate falsehoods, never.
6. Do not underestimate the mental capacity and ability of your subject.
11. Be dominant without being domineering.7 6

In my view, such instructions would not be justified
in a police training manual. 7 7 They are even more
inappropriate in a scheme where the emphasis should be
on giving assistance to disadvantaged people.

The Problem of Overpayments
Periodically, public attention is focussed on the problem of overpayments in unemployment insurance.II For
example, in 1979, as a result of computer error overpayments amounting to $4.3 million were made to
claimants in Nova Scotia, Quebec and British Columbia.7 9 But in no case of overpayment that I know of has
it been shown that the recipients were acting other than
in good faith. Despite this fact, the reporting of these
cases by the press often suggests that the payments were
not received in good faith. The Commission also seems
to take the view that these receipts of benefit constitute
a serious form of abuse, judging from the aggressive
measures it has often taken to recover these overpayments. 0
What is truly remarkable is the contrast between
the law of mistaken payments in social security law and
the general law relating to mistaken payments. Under
the general law of mistaken payments, the Supreme
Court of Canada has held that individuals who receive
and spend mistaken payment in good faith may successfully plead the defence of change of position, i.e. that
they have spent the money.8 ' As with the law relating to
'collateral benefits', 8 2 conduct which is thought to be
perfectly legitimate suddenly becomes either immoral
and/or illegal when performed by a social security recipient.
122

The Problem of the Voluntary Quit
From time to time the complaint is made that the
Commission is not taking a sufficiently hard line against
the people Mr. Atkey, formerly Minister for Employment, described as "the biggest abusers of all - those
who voluntarily quit jobs without just cause."" According to Mr. Atkey, voluntary quitters "stay on unemployment insurance claims substantially longer than others
and show the least inclination to seriously look for alternative employment or training."8 4
In the first place, there is no evidence that voluntary quitters stay on unemployment insurance claims
substantially longer than others and show little inclination in looking for alternative employment or training.
Indeed, few voluntary quitters claim benefits at all. According to Mr. Atkey, one in four voluntary quitters
files a claim," while another protagonist in the recent
debate claims that only one out of ten voluntary quitters
actually becomes an unemployment insurance
claimant. 6
In the second place, if one examines the causes of
job quits, it is impossible to regard the reasons given as
frivolous. A Statistics Canada study showed that in
1977 24,000 workers had left their jobs because of illness or disability, 20,000 because of changed residence
and 57,000 because of job dissatisfaction" due to low
wages and poor working conditions as well as the desire
to move from part-time to full-time work. With regard
to the first two classes of claimants, the disabled and
those who change their residence, there should be little
difficulty in deciding the merits of these cases. The difficult problems concern the 57,000 workers who quit
their work because of job dissatisfaction. If penalties
for voluntary quitters were increased, this might have

75.
76.
77.

78.

79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.

Id., p. 88.
Id., p. 83.
If such instructions were included in a police training manual,
one would hope that bodies such as the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association would express outrage.
The Commission has the right to demand the repayment of
monies up to three years after they were collected by an individual and, in a case where the Commission contends that
fraud was involved, it has up to six years to demand repayment.
The Commission has power to forgive repayments if the "money
is uncollectable" or if repayment would cause "undue hardship".
1 Low Income Law (No. 2) 16 (1979).
The Commission has the power to garnish wages and/or issue
demand for payment to third parties (e.g., banks). If it chooses
the latter route, it does not need any court order.
See supra note 10.
Compare text at supra notes 43-48 to text at supra notes 49-54.
Letter to the Globe and Mail, July 14, 1980.
Letter to the Globe and Mail, July 19, 1980.
Id.
Letter from Mr. Basil Hargrove, Administrative Assistant to
U.A.W. Director for Canada to the Globe and Mail, July 18,
1980.
Statistics Canada, Statistical Report on the Operation of the
Unemployment Insurance Act 1976-77 (Ottawa, 1978), pp.
19-21.
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the effect of keeping workers in jobs where they should
not be, e.g., in jobs where the safety conditions are
abysmal. The effect of increasing the disqualification
may also be to discourage employees from moving from
low-paying jobs where their talents might not be fully
employed to better paying jobs.
But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the voluntary quit disqualification is the extremely rigid view
taken by the Commission towards what constitutes a
voluntary quit. On reading the decisions of the Board of
Referees, it sometimes appears that the Commission will
treat every quit as a voluntary quit.
Thus, in a number of decisions it has been held that
developing a great fear of dismemberment by machinery
does not relieve a claimant from disqualification for
voluntary quit.II Again, workers who take advantage of
early retirement schemes will be deemed to have left
their employment without 'just cause'. 9 Further,
employees who leave their jobs because of low-pay or
because they wish to improve their qualifications do not
do so with 'just cause' although their motives may be
praised. 9 0 The Commission has also disqualified a male
teacher who quit his job in Alberta and moved with his
wife who had obtained a job in Ontario. Fortunately,
the Commission's decision was reversed by the Board of
Referees" but there would be nothing to prevent the
Commission from imposing a disqualification in a
subsequent case and letting the claimant appeal against
the decision. 9 2 Reading these decisions gives weight to
the claim of a former information officer for the Commission's Toronto office that "UI staff work under
orders to impose virtually automatic penalties on claimants who quit their jobs - whether they deserve a penalty or not". 93
Once the allegation of abuse and fraud are swept
away as they should be in the light of the evidence, the
whole argument over the voluntary quit issue centres
around the extent to which one wishes to encourage
labour mobility. The present unemployment insurance
system acting together with forces such as private pension schemes, 9 4 have the intention and effect of restricting labour mobility. There are arguments for restricting
labour mobility, although they seem to me to rest on
feudalistic assumptions of the employment relationship.
On the other hand, there are very powerful reasons for
encouraging labour mobility. It would be helpful if the
'just quit' provision in the Unemployment InsuranceAct
were to be discussed in those terms rather than by
obscuring these issues and turning the matter into a
question of 'abuse'.

Some Undiscussed Aspects of
the Unemployment Insurance System
There are at least three aspects of the unemployment insurance scheme which do not seem to figure in
public discussion on 'abuse' in the unemployment insurance system although they are regarded with great
disfavour by a very large number of claimants. It is
necessary to examine these neglected areas if we are to
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

view the unemployment insurance system in some kind
of context.
1. The Financing of Unemployment Insurance
The regressive manner in which the unemployment
insurance system is financed is well described in The National Council of Welfare's publication, Bearing The
Burden: Sharing The Benefits.95 Unemployment insurance is financed, in part, through a payroll tax. The
tax rate is 1.5/o of earnings with an insurable limit of
$240 a week. 9 6 As the National Council of Welfare
points out:
The maximum on insurable earnings and the deductibility
of premiums result in another regressive tax. Everyone
earning above the maximum insurable level pays the same
amount of tax but once again, this decreases as a proportion of earnings as income rises, while the deduction goes
up in value as a person moves into higher tax brackets. The
1.5 per cent tax rate charged to a minimum-wage worker
earning $6,300 a year decreases to a .75 per cent rate for a
$25,000-a-year earner.
Incredibly, what low-income workers get for paying at the
highest rate is the lowest coverage. An $8,000-a-year earner
pays $120 in net unemployment insurance premiums to buy
coverage which guarantees him $103 a week, if he loses his
job. A $25,000-a-year earner pays $112 in net premiums to
buy coverage worth $160 a week.97

It is scandalous that the armies of politicians and
journalists who write about 'abuse' in the unemployment insurance system do not make any mention of the
iniquitous manner in which the scheme is financed.
2. The Labour Dispute Disentitlement
In 1976 29,525 claimants were disentitled from
claiming unemployment insurance benefits and in 1977
12,245 persons were disentitled from claiming unemployment insurance benefits. 98 This occurred as a result
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See, e.g., C. U.B. 2538, September 30, 1965.
See, e.g., C.U.B. 3332, June 25, 1973.
See, e.g., C.U.B. 3247, January 22, 1973.
See C. U.B. 3298, April 25, 1973.
There will be very few appeals under the Unemployment InsuranceAct first, because there are few more complex statutes in
existence, and second, because the number of people who have
any knowledge of its intricacies is pitifully small.
93. See the letter by Mr. Victor Schwartzman to the Globe andMail,
July 24, 1980.
94. See the article by Professor H.J. Glasbeek, "A Proposal for a
Non-Earnings Related Retirement Income Scheme," 2 Canadian
Taxation 186 (1980).
95. National Council of Welfare, Bearing the Burden: Sharing the
Benefits (Ottawa, 1978), pp. 10-13.
96. I have used the same figures used by the National Council of
Welfare since the change in insurable earnings does not affect the
argument.
97. National Council of Welfare, supra note 95.
98. Statistics Canada, supra note 87.
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of the operation of section 44 of the Unemployment InsuranceAct, 1971, which provides that a worker who is
unable to work because of a strike or lockout is not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. Despite the
fact that large numbers of people are affected, the
labour dispute disqualification stirs neither the interest
of politicians nor the press.
This must be so because the justice for the disentitlement is thought to be self-evident. In fact, the
justice for the disentitlement is highly problematic. The
chief reason for the rule is that the denial of benefits
furthers the position of state neutrality. But as commentators have pointed out,9 9 to the extent that payment of
benefits would help strikers, the denial of benefits helps
the employer. Since there can be no neutral position, the
real question is why the government should choose to be
neutral on the side of the employer. Any proposal that
the government should achieve neutrality by withdrawing forms of government assistance such as DREE grants,
tariffs, tax credits and other advantages to employers
when a strike or lock-out occurs would be fiercely opposed by those who adhere to the 'neutrality on the side
of the employer' point of view.

[Bly grossly exaggerating the extent of
fraud and abuse that occurs, politicians
help build up a climate of opinion which
enables cut-backs to be made and which
also tolerates abusive practices towards
those receiving social security benefits.
Another reason frequently given for the disentitlement is that it is wrong to give unemployment insurance
to people who have voluntarily terminated their employment: But, as the law stands, it is possible for a striker
to claim unemployment insurance benefits in some cases
because section 44 only requires "a stoppage of work".
Thus, in one case, a claimant who was on strike and active on the picket line was held entitled to claim benefits
because there was "no stoppage of work" at her place of
employment. The employer's business (telephone answering service) was such that he was able to continue
operations

in

spite

of

the

strike.100

This

voluntary/involuntary rationale for terminating
benefits is inconsistant with the present law in another
respect. If workers are being denied unemployment
benefits because of their voluntary action, then it would
seem to follow that workers who have lost their employment involuntarily by virtue of being locked out should
be able to receive benefits. Yet employees who are locked out are also denied unemployment benefits.1 0 1
A third argument in support of the neutrality
stance is that the payment of unemployment insurance
to strikers would drain the unemployment insurance
fund. But very few people have proposed that claimants
should be entitled to unemployment insurance benefits
as of right. What is proposed is that the only means of
124

achieving neutrality is to off-set the present section 44
with rules that deny private firms subsidies.
A final argument is that any change in section 44
would have a serious effect on collective bargaining. But
the fact that legal machinery is capable of having an influence on collective bargaining has not meant that that
legal machinery has been rejected. If this were so, we
would never have had labour boards with their power,
inter alia, to fix the size of bargaining units. Besides,
New York and Rhode Island pay claimants unemployment insurance benefits six weeks after the commencement of a dispute' 0 2 and collective bargaining flourishes
in those states.
Even if the labour dispute disentitlement is not
totally recast, some of its excesses might, with great profit, be removed from the law.
At the present time claimants are denied benefits
whether the employer is acting illegally or not. For example, in one case radio station workers were locked
out by their employer during the course of negotiations,
a direct violation of the Canada Labour Code.'0 3 In
spite of the fact that the claimants wanted to continue to
work (and in fact were legally obliged to do so under
labour relations legislation) but were prevented from
doing so by the employer's illegal act, their claims for
unemployment benefits were denied.1 0 4 Results such as
these seem defensible only if unions are perceived as illegal organizations.
A worker will be disentitled from receiving unemployment insurance benefits if he or she has been financing the dispute. Many workers have reason to complain
of the absurdly broad meaning given to financing a
labour dispute. A vivid example of the kind of absurdity
is afforded by the decision in McKinnon and Canadian
Food and Allied Workers v. U.I.C. o5 Mrs. McKinnon
was employed by a company where the employees,
although represented by the same union, were divided
into several bargaining units. She belonged to the union
and like all members, paid union dues part of which
were used, as provided by the union's constitution, for a
strike fund. In May 1975, Mrs. McKinnon lost her job
as the result of a strike of employees of the same company who belonged to another bargaining unit but were
represented by the same union. During the strike this
union paid the strikers money from its strike fund which
had been set up using dues paid by all members of the
union. Incredibly, Mrs. McKinnon was denied benefits
because it was held that she was "financing" the strike
by paying union dues, some of which went into the
strike fund!
99.

See, e.g., Lesser, "Labour Disputes and Unemployment Compensation," 55 Yale Law Journal 167, 175 (1945).

100. See, e.g., C. U.B. 3709, September 4, 1974.
101. See, e.g., C.U.B. 3709, October 6, 1974.
102 New York Telephone Co. v. New York Dept. of Labor, 99 Sup.
Ct. 1328 (U.S. S.C., 1979).
103. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1.
104. C. U.B. 3357, August 3, 1973.
105. (1977), 77 C.L.L.C. 14, 102 (Fed. C.A.).
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Workers will also be disentitled if they belong to
the same "grade or class" of workers as the workers in
dispute. How this is capable of working in practice is illustrated by a dispute in the B.C. logging industry. Production was delayed after a strike had been settled.
Negotiations were underway between employers and the
various unions for a master agreement to cover all occupational groups in the labour force. Before the time
for a legal strike had arrived, the fallers staged a wildcat
strike with the result that members of other occupational groups were laid off because of a shortage of
work. The official strike did not take place for another
month and was settled within a few weeks, but the wildcatters stayed out for another month in protest over the
agreement. As a result, normal production was delayed.
Despite the fact that the claimants were members of the
trades who had signed the agreement, and were ready to
return to work but were unable to do so because of the
wildcat, their claims for benefits were denied by the
Umpire. It was held, that since the "work stoppage"
arising from the labour dispute began on the day of the
wildcat, their claim for benefits should be denied.
Although the claimants had not participated in the illegal strike nor had any control over its course they were
deemed to be the same "grade or class" of worker as the
wildcatters and were disqualified on that ground. 0 6 It
seems impossible to attempt any kind of justification
for this result.
Finally, a very broad interpretation is given to
"directly interested". In perhaps the leading case on the
subject a claimant who was not a member of the union,
nor even of the bargaining unit, was laid off by his
employer because of a shortage of work due to a strike.
Benefits were denied by the Umpire on the ground that
because his wages and working conditions were likely to
be "affected" by the outcome of the dispute, he had a
"direct interest" in it. Although he was not covered by
the collective agreement, the fact that his employer
might adjust the wages of his non-union staff in accordance with any new agreement was a close enough connection to the dispute to disentitle him under section
44.107. Again, it seems impossible to provide any kind
of rationale for decisions of this kind.

09
former job does not have "good cause for delay".1
Similarly, employees who delay making claims because
they are waiting for employment'O or medical
recordsI'' will not, save in exceptional circumstances,
have "good cause for delay".
The Commission takes a very stringent line about
denying claimants benefits because of their ignorance qf
the law. The harshness of the present law is illustrated
by the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Re
Pirottev. Unemployment Insuirance Commission." 2 In
that case, the claimant knew that she had a right to
claim unemployment insurance benefits but she did not
know the procedure for making a claim. She sought information from an employee in the Quebec Department
of Education in which she had been employed. She was
advised by this employee that she must report her termination of employment to the offices of the Unemployment Insurance Commission in Ottawa and await a
reply from them which might take some considerable
time. As a result of receiving this information, the applicant delayed in submitting her application.
The Federal Court of Appeal held that there was
"no good cause for delay" since, if the present claim
were allowed, it would undermine "the principle that ignorance of the law does not excuse failure to comply
with a statutory provision."' '3 The court noted that the
principle had "sometimes been criticized as implying an
unreasonable imputation of knowledge but it has long
been recognized as essential to the maintainence and
operation of the legal order."' 14
The difficulty with this argument is that it proves
too much. If knowledge of the law is truly a bedrock of
our civilization, then it should make no difference that
the claimant was misled by an employee of the Commission or by his or her own employer. Yet, in the former
case, the claimant will be able to plead that there was
"good cause for delay". The court states, lamely, in
justification of this distinction, "In such a case we
would be dealing not so much with ignorance of the law
as with mistake induced by representations on behalf of
the Commission".'
This semantic nonsense explains
nothing and does nothing to give authority to a very
weak and mischievous opinion.

3. The Problem of Late Claims and Ante-dating
Theoretically, the Unemployment Act, 1971 allows
a claimant who has filed a late claim to ante-date the
claim. This is so provided the claimant has had "good
cause for his delay" under subsection 20(4) of the Act.
The interpretation of this phrase is an extremely serious
issue in practice as employees make late claims because
of ignorance, sickness or through getting wrong advice
from union officials, employers, lawyers and other persons who give advice. The difficulty is that the Commission takes the view that "antedating is an exceptional
measure to which may resort only claimants who have
been prevented from filing their claim earlier by conditions beyond their control". 0 8 Thus, an employee who
delays making a claim because he expects a recall to a
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

106. C.U.B. 3497, April 5, 1974.
107. C.U.B. 3251, February 5, 1973.
108. See Unemployment Insurance Commission, Digest of Benefit
Entitlement Principles(Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services,
1980), p. 1-100(6).
109. See, e.g., C.U.B. 3490, March, 1974.
110. See C. U.B. 6146, January 9, 1981, where it was stated that relief
was denied but that it might be granted in 'special' circumstances.
Ill. See C. U.B. 6512, January 7, 1981 where again relief was denied
but it was stated that it might be granted in 'special' circumstances.
112. (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 442 (Fed. C.A.).
113. Id., p. 444.
114. Id.
115. Id., p. 445.
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The opinion fails to take into account how natural
it is for many, if not most, employees to turn to their
employers for advice on how to make a claim - particularly in a case such as the present where the
employer is a government department. After all, it is the
employer who pays the premiums and who has control
over the employee's employment record. The employer
has contact with the Commission during the currency of
the employment, whereas the employee has none. It is
natural, therefore, that on termination of employment
the employee should ask the employer where she or he
should go to file a claim.
The effect of the Pirotte case can be seen in an unfortunate subsequent decision. In this later case the applicant retired on pension from her teaching position on
June 30, 1978 and subsequently took up residence in
Saskatoon. After having studied the form used by the
Commission, the claimant thought that since she was in
receipt of a pension, she was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. The Commission knew of her
situation but did not advise her of a right to benefits.' 16
Finally, the claimant applied for benefits on May
25, 1979 after looking for work for a considerable
period of time. On learning on that date that she had a
inadequate number of weeks to qualify for benefits, she
applied to have her claim ante-dated to September 15,
1978. The Umpire held that the claimant's conduct had
been exemplary. He said, "One can readily sympathize
with the applicant and others placed in the same situation. An attempt to obtain and keep employment, must
be admired."' 'I Despite this fact, the Umpire felt that in
the light of the Pirotte decision he had to reject the
claim. There is something seriously wrong with a rule
that commends claimants for having acted in an exemplary manner and yet denies them benefits.
Professor Partington has shown in his valuable
study, Claim in Time"' that the British have found it
possible to have a much more flexible law with regard to
late claims. In particular, relief has been given to
claimants who have relied on mistaken advice from paralegals 119 and from lawyers.' 2 0 It would be beneficial if
those responsible for amending and administering the
Unemployment Insurance Act would study the United
Kingdom experience. After all, if the point at issue were
some minor problem in say, contract law, our lawmakers would be familiar with developments in the
United Kingdom. In the vastly more important field of
social security law, blindness is the order of the day.' 2 '

Conclusion
It is true that a great majority of Canadians feel
that the unemployment system is being abused. But
there are very good reasons to be skeptical of what
figures purport to show. In the first place, the polls were
taken after the government had spent a large amount of
money telling people that unemployment insurance
fraud was a significant problem. Second, citizens are
given very little education in even the fundamentals of
the unemployment insurance system. Even law students
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are not required to know anything about the system
either by their universities or by their law societies. In
such an atmosphere of ignorance it is possible for the
government to make unsubstantiated charges of abuse.
These charges of abuse go largely unchallenged and they
prepare the way for cutbacks in levels of benefit and in
qualifying periods. These cutbacks are not addressed to
any 'abuse', but the fact that the government has alleged
abuse makes it easier for it to tighten up the unemployment insurance rules. In short, what appears to be taking place is the cynical use of alleged abuse to justify
cutting unemployment insurance costs. These cuts are
being made at a time when there is a great need to
revamp the whole unemployment insurance system and
change it from a regressive tax system to a system of
clear and easily discovered rules applied with consistency and compassion by men and women whose principal
skill is not the ability to detect fraud.

PART III
WELFARE
Welfare Fraud
Although Canadian initiatives to detect welfare
fraud are not as flamboyant as those in the United
States,1 2 2 feelings about welfare fraud have run very
high. For example, in Manitoba the NDP premier began
an investigation into welfare fraud sensing the "profound, seething resentment" of voters towards
welfare.1 23 Even Quebec, which had a reputation for a
liberal welfare policy, took steps to cut out ineligibles.
In March 1972 the government announced that an audit
had allowed the exclusion of seven per cent of the case
load. In 1973 the province computerized its welfare
rolls, reducing the number of recipients by a further
four per cent.1 24 In recent years, even small
municipalities have appointed officials to prosecute for
fraud.1 25 There is some evidence that there is "profound, seething resentment" on the part of the general
population towards welfare abuse. A 1972 government

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.

122.
123.
124.
125.

C.U.B. 6154, January 7, 1981.
Id. p. 2.
M. Partington, Claim in Time (London: Frances Pinter, 1978).
R.(U) 9/74.
See C.S.I. 10/50 and C.S. 50/50. The first case dealt with a claim
under the industrial injuries scheme and the second claim was for
sickness benefit. However it is difficult to see any difference between these benefits and unemployment benefit.
In Pirotte, supra note 112, the Federal Court of Appeal cited two
cases - one dealing with immigration law and the other dealing
with the statute of limitations in an accident case. No authority
involving a social security issue was cited.
See Leman, supra note 1.
Quoted in Leman, supra note 1, p. 209.
Id.
See supra note 14. Other municipalities are contemplating
following Durham's example.
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study in Alberta showed that most Albertans polled said
thirty per cent of those on assistance did not deserve
help. A third of the respondents said welfare abuse exceeded forty per cent of the total case-load.' 2 6
1. The range of welfare criminality
Before turning to examine the number of welfare
prosecutions, it is instructive to look at the range of the
'welfare' criminal law. It will be seen that its range is
remarkably broad.
A number of provinces make it an offence for a
welfare recipient to fail to report any income or
resources received while in receipt of welfare payments.
In New Brunswick, for example, it is an offence not to
comply with an obligation to notify the Director in
writing of any additional income or resources "within 15
days of receiving it."l27 Similar provisions exist in
Manitoba,' 2 8 British Columbia,129 Saskatchewan'3 0
and Alberta.' 3 '.
These provisions are difficult to defend. First, the
claimant may be entitled to keep the resources, whether
they take the form of part-time earnings,1 32 payment
from the criminal injuries compensation board' 3 or the
receipt of a gift from a friend or relative.1 34
Second, a welfare recipient may believe in good
faith, acting perhaps on the advice of a friend, a social
worker or an employer, that she or he is entitled to keep
the benefit. In this connection it is useful to examine
Jean James's figures in respect of the knowledge of
mothers on family benefits as to their basic earnings exemption, the tax-back rate and the number of hours that
could be worked per month without losing entitlement
to benefits.
TABLE 3
Knowledge of Mothers Receiving Family Benefits
as to Their Basic Exemptions, Tax-Back Rates
and Number of Hours that can be Worked per Month
Knowledge of
Knowledge of
Basic Earnings Off-set rate over
Exemption
Exemption Level

Permissible
Hours
Per Month

Correct
Incorrect
Don't Know

39.9%
31.2%
29%

13.7%
40.3%7
46%

10.8%
42.5%
46.7%

No. of
Respondents

414

402

409

Source: J. James, Family Benefits Mothers in Metropolitan Toronto
(Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, Research and Planning Branch, Report 2, 1973), p.
105.

With ignorance on this scale, it seems cruel and
senseless to impose criminal penalties for failing to
report this kind of information. After all, a taxpayer is
not required, under threat from the criminal law, to
report on his or her initiative information to Revenue
Canada. The taxpayer is asked, in effect, a great
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

number of specific questions so that his or her tax bill
can be calculated. Similarly, a welfare recipient should
be asked every, say, six months as to changes in his or
her financial status so that appropriate adjustments can
be made. If the welfare claimant wilfully and knowingly
makes a false statement with intent to defraud, that
should be treated as an offence.
Another area where the welfare criminal law seems
to operate in a bizarre fashion is in the area of cohabitation. In Ontario in 1977-78, 63.5 per cent of cases "actively reviewed" for prosecution involved claimants not
living as single persons.'
The difficulty here is that
there are two definitions of cohabitation. The first is the
definition given in the critically important decision of
the Ontario Divisional Court in Re Proc.'3 6 In that case,
the court held that the crucial test in determining
whether there was cohabitation was the economic unit
test, that is, had the parties entered into what looked
like a permanent economic union. However, there is a
second view of cohabitation that is set out in the Ontario General Welfare Assistance' 3 7 and the Ontario
Family Benefits manuals.'13

126. Goyette, "Poverty Amid the Oil Wells," in [1981] Perception
(Spring/Summer) 49,54.
127. See subsection 9(2) of the Social Welfare Act, R.S. N.B. 1973, c.
5-11.
128. See paragraph 22(b) of the Social Allowances Act, R.S.M. 1970,
c. S-160.
129. See paragraph 19(1)(b) of the GuaranteedAvailable Income for
Need Act, R.S. B.C. 1979, c. 158.
130. See subsection 28(3) of the Saskatchewan Assistance Act,
R.S.S., 1978, c.5-8.
131. See section 13 of the Social Development Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.
5-16.
132. For a discussion of the rules on outside earnings see text at infra
notes 243-51.
133. Re Elliott and Attorney General of Ontario, [1973] 2 O.R. 534
(C.A.). The Court of Appeal held that the claimant was entitled
to keep a sum awarded by the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board without this affecting her right to welfare payments. That
decision has now been reversed by regulation but at the time of
receiving the compensation, the Court of Appeal does not seem
to have thought the claimant was obliged to report the sum she
had received.
134. Many provincial welfare statutes distinguish between "regular
gifts" which are treated as income and casual gifts which are not
to be treated as an addition to the claimant's liquid assets. Thus,
a gift to Mrs. Clara Wuziuk of $400 from a friend to enable her
to take her first holiday in ten years was held to be a "casual" gift
by the Manitoba Court of Appeal. See Riley, Manitoba Casual
Gifts, 1 Low Income Law (No. 3) 1 (1980).
135. Information supplied by Mr. D. Alfieri, Director Income
Maintenance Branch, Ministry of Community and Social Services of Ontario, on February 26, 1980.
136. (1974) 53 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario Court of
Appeal dismissed the appeal of the Minister without recorded
reasons on April 1, 1975. See Comment, "Proc in the Ontario
Court of Appeal," 4 Bull. Canadian Welfare Law (No. 1) 44
(1976).
137. Published by Ministry of Community and Social Services, Ontario, July 21, 1980.
138. Published by Ministry of Community and Social Services,
January 1, 1980.
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These manuals do not mention the Proc decision;
instead they set out criteria for determining cohabitation which the Proc court went to considerable pains to
reject. The criteria listed are, first, "familial," examples
of which are: "(a) the couple occupy the same premises;
(b) documents, such as leases, are titled or signed as Mr.
and Mrs. (c) the couple are known or recognized in the
neighbourhood or community at large, as husband and
wife; (d) birth records or other records record the couple
as husband ans wife."' 3 9
The next criterion is "sexual" which on a reading of
the manuals appears to be both relevant and irrelevant.
The manuals state, "This relationship is difficult to
prove, and for all intents and purposes is not relevant to
the eligibility process. A possible exception, however,
would be where, in an alleged common law relationship,
the man with whom the woman is supposed to be living
is the father of her child(ren). In these circumstances,
the fact the man is declared father might, in conjunction
with other indicators, be supportive of a finding that the
mother is not living as a single person. Self-admission of
an ongoing sexual relationship is also acceptable."l 4 0
The third factor is "social", examples of which are:
"(a) acknowledgement on the part of either party to a
husband/wife relationship; (b) the couple are invited
and accept invitations as Mr. and Mrs. and are recognized at gatherings as husband and wife; (c) they vacation
as husband and wife; (d) they sign as Mr. and Mrs."l41
The manuals also give a number of examples of the
economic criterion, examples of which include: "(a)
whether in tendering credit one party can purchase
goods and services in the name of the other; (b) there are
joint bank accounts and pooling of other financial
resources; (c) the male claims the recipient and/or
child(ren) for income tax purposes, unemployment insurance or other similar benefits." 4 2
Not surprisingly, the Ontario Social Assistance
Review Board adopts the same approach in defining
cohabitation. In his extremely valuable examination of
forty-two decisions by the Board on the cohabitation
rule, Professor R.W. Kerr of the University of Windsor
Law School found that there was no reference to the
principles set out in Re Proc.14 3 Instead, the Board
relied on the numerous factors set out in the manuals.
If, as seems most likely, the welfare fraud squad
adopts the same approach towards cohabitation as do
the manuals and the Social Assistance Review Board,
then the scope of the criminal law is being widened
beyond the legislatively designed and judicially defined
rules. Even if most of the cases which are 'actively investigated' or referred to prosecution result in the claimant being cut off rather than being convicted of a
criminal offence, very great harm is being done as a
result of illegal acts of welfare administrators.
2. The Prosecutions
I tried to obtain figures for the number of prosecutions and convictions for all the provinces for the
previous three years. One province (Manitoba) failed to
supply statistics on the ground of confidentiality.1 4 4 The
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other provinces gave no information as to what kind of
offences claimants were guilty of and how many received prison sentences. The statistics follow:
Table 4
Criminal Convictions for Welfare Fraud
Province by Province
Alberta
Nature of cases
1978 1979 1980
Income
Assets
Common Law (Cohabitation)
Forgeries
Others

214
30
97
87
157
585

196
26
96
96
179
593

200
31
131
70
177
609

Disposition
Unfounded
Closed
Refund Agreement
Convictions
Others

29
31
22
57
40
53
164
73
179
25
23
11
23
195
312
466a
553
458
Source: Information supplied by Mr. M. Casavant,
Program Administrator, Appeals & Investigations, Income Security Branch, in a letter dated
April 30, 1981.
a. In 1980, 117 cases were still under investigation.
Ontario

Cases Actively taken under Review
Cases Not pursued for Investigation and/or Prosecution
Passed to Police for Investigation
Persons Charged
Disposition
Guilty
Acquitted
Charge Withdrawn
Sentences Imposed
Jail
Suspended Sentence
Probation
Community Work
Fine
Conditional Discharge
Restitution

1977-78

1978-79

349

288

233
186

170

1979-80

154
86

86
19
4

128
26

5
10

39
39
61

50
75
108
15
8
1

6
34

Source: Information supplied by Mr. D. Alfieri, Director, Income
Maintenance, in a letter dated March 17, 1981.
139. See the General Welfare Assistance manual 0303-08, p. 3; see the
Family Benefits manual guideline No. 11, p. 2.
140. G.W.A. manual 0303-08, p. 4; F.B.A. manual, guideline No. 11,
p. 2.
141. G.W.A. manual 0303-08, p. 4; F.B.A. manual No. 11, p. 3.
142. G.W.A. manual 0303-08, p. 4; F.B.A. manual No. 11, p. 3.
143. See Kerr, "Living Together as Husband and Wife: The Current
Approach to the 'Man in the House' Rule under Ontario's
Welfare Law," 1 Low Income Law (No. 1) 29 (1979). Professor
Kerr concludes that the "decisions of the Ontario Social
Assistance Review Board evidence little appreciation of the
Court's direction in Proc's case to apply an economic test, and
leave room to suspect a continued application of moral standards" (p. 34).
144. Letter from Ms. Roxy Freedman, Executive Director Social
Security Services, June 2, 1981.
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Average Number of Claimants Convicted of Fraud
in the Various Provinces

British Columbia
1978-79

1979-80

1980-81

235
133

212
135

208
128

Charged
Convicted

Source: Information supplied by Mr. Roy Johnson, Ministry Inspector
in a letter dated April 13, 1981.
Manitoba
No figures made available because of policy of confidentiality.
New Brunswick
Complete data is not available but three or four cases are prosecuted
every year. These usually result in a few months' imprisonment.
Source: Information supplied by Mr. Georgio Gaudet, Deputy Minister,
Department of Social Services, in a letter dated April 13, 1981.
Newfoundland
1978

1979

1980

136
109

114
91

87
37

Charged
Convicted

Source: Information supplied by Mr. M.J. Vincent, Director of Social
Assistance, in a letter dated April 21, 1981.
Nova Scotia
Since 1978 there have been 29 prosecutions, of which 16 have resulted
in convictions and 10 in acquittals. Three cases are still being tried.
There is no year-by-year breakdown available.
Source: Information supplied by Department of Social Services by telephone, August 4, 1981.
Prince Edward Island
Five people have been convicted of welfare fraud in the last three years.
Source: Information supplied by Mr. J.D. Seaman, Director of Prosecutions, in a letter dated April 10, 1981.

No. of Claimants
Convicted Every Yr.
on Average

No. of
Convictions
Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia

59
396
N/A
12
237
16

Ontario
Prince Edward
Island
Quebec
Saskatchewan

(1978-80)
(1978-81)

20

20
132

251

(1978-80)
(1978-80)
(1977-80)
(1978-81)
(1977-80)

4
79
84
5
84

56
36

(1978-80)
(1976-78)
(1978-80)

2
19
12

It seems, therefore, that less than 400 welfare
claimants are convicted every year in Canada. This is a
remarkably low figure considering that the number of
people relying on social assistance at any point in time a
year has been estimated at between 1.8 million and 2.3
million. I41
It might be argued that the estimate of 400 persons

... cut-offs are very dangerous indicia

to use in any argument about criminality. The only inference that can be
drawn from them is that the claimant is
suspected of having infringed the
welfare regulations. It is erroneous to
draw any inferences of criminality from
cut-offs.

Quebec

Cases Investigated
Convictions
Prison Sentences

1976

1977

1978

24
13
7

52
28
10

37
4
2

Source: Information supplied by M. Andre Roy, Director General of
Welfare, in a letter dated May 12, 1981.
Saskatchewan
No. of Cases No. of New
Charges
Referred to
Police
Laid
1978
1979
1980

57
64
30

15
17

No. of
Convictions
15
11
10

Source: Information supplied by Mr. A.W. Uhren, Assistant Executive Director, Income Support Division in a letter dated
May 12, 1981.
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convicted of welfare fraud is unrealistic since a figure
of, say, ten times that magnitude is cut off without a
trial being brought. There is no doubt that cut-offs are
widely used. The Alberta pilot study on welfare fraud in
1979 showed that termination of benefits was frequently
resorted to.14 6 Also, as has been noted above, Quebec
has resorted to cut-offs.1 47
But cut-offs are very dangerous indicia to use in
any argument about criminality. The only inference that
can be drawn from them is that the claimant is suspected

145. See Interprovincial Task Force on Social Security, The Income
Security System in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Intergovernmental Copference Secretariat, 1980), p. 91, cited in National
Council of Welfare, The Working Poor: People and Programs
-Statistical Profile (Ottawa, 1981), p. 81.
146. See Alberta Social Services and Community Health, Final
Report of the Welfare Ineligibility Study-Fraudand Errorin the
Public Assistance Program, mimeo, 1979.
147. See text at supra note 124.
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of having infringed the welfare regulations. It is erroneous to draw any inferences of criminality from cutoffs.
Indeed, the problem with cut-offs is that Canadian
welfare law provides inadequate safeguards against the
possibility of arbitrary cut-offs. In the United States, as
a result of the landmark decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly,148 a recipient of welfare must be given a hearing
before she or he is cut off welfare benefits. No Canadian province gives this degree of protection. Prince Edward Island provides that when a claimant appeals
against a termination or reduction of benefits,
assistance shall be paid at emergency level until the decision of the Appeal Board.149 Ontario has a similar provision in its Family Benefits Act. I The Ontario General
Welfare Assistance Act contains language that comes
closest to the principle in Goldberg v. Kelly. The relevant provision states that "where practicable, a welfare
administrator shall afford an applicant for or recipient
of assistance... an opportunity to make submissions
before suspension, cancellation or refusal of the
assistance to show why such action should not be
taken."' I'

Provisions such as the ones to be found in the
Prince Edward Island legislation and in the Ontario
Family Benefits Act require that the claimant know that
he or she has a right of appeal to a welfare appeal board
but the Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust
estimated in 1975 that about fifty per cent of Canadian
welfare recipients did not know that they had a right to
appeal an unfavourable welfare decision.
Most welfare statutes are silent on the question of
procedural protections for the welfare recipient who has
been cut off, and the legislation in Newfoundland' 5 2
and Nova Scotia'5 3 give very broad powers to administrators to suspend, lower or withhold social
assistance payments without any hearing being given to
the claimant.
3. The Range of Sentences Imposed
There is a remarkable disparity in the penalties imposed on delinquent welfare claimants. Newfoundland
has a conscious policy of not prosectuting welfare
claimants under the Criminal Code. 14 Moreover, this
province usually does not ask for jail sentences but asks
for fines and probation orders.'II Ontario, on the other
hand does use the CriminalCode, ' 6 and, in the last two
years 39 persons out of 86 convicted and 50 out of 128
convicted have received prison sentences.'"5
These are the only two provinces that seem to have
relatively clear prosecution policies. In the other provinces, there is an enormous discrepancy in sentencing.
This can be seen by looking at three Manitoba cases.
First, in Simm,'5 8 decided by the Manitoba Court of
Appeal in September 1975, a mother claimed benefits in
respect of two children when she only had one. She was
ordered to make full restitution but a three month
prison sentence was reduced to a suspended sentence. In
Said,'59 a case decided by Manitoba Provincial Court in
130

1979, the accused failed to report a common law spouse
and one year's employment. As a result, she had received $14,000 she ought not to have received over 4/2
years. Upon conviction, she was placed on one year's
probation and was not required to make any restitution.
These two cases should be contrasted with the decision
in Ashdown.16 0 In the latter case, the accused had obtained $2,400 fraudulently. Despite the fact that she was
a first offender, and had two children and was six
months pregnant, she was sentenced to a six month jail
sentence and ordered to make full restitution.
The decision in Ashdown and similar cases,1 6'
raises the question of whether imprisonment is a
suitable sentence for welfare recipients. It is extremely
doubtful if the threat of imprisonment deters for the
reason that was advanced by the Edinburgh Council on
Social Service before the Fisher Committee on the
Abuse of Social Security Benefits.
The Council told the Committee, "In general, we
feel that the majority of people who resort to such
devices to defraud the [Supplementary Benefits] Commission do so out of the necessity to obtain an income at
subsistence level rather than from irresponsible

choice".1 6 2
The second argument against imprisonment as an
appropriate sanction is that it is expensive. The cost per
diem of incarcerating a prisoner in an Ontario jail in
1977-78 came to about $47.16s Four years later, that

figure can safely be said to exceed $60 a day. If there are
children who have to be relocated, that cost will exceed

148. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For an attempt to assess the impact of the
decision in one state see Student Note, "Procedural Due Process
and the Welfare Recipient: A Statistical Study of A.F.D.C
Hearings in Wisconsin," [1978] Winconsin Law Review 145.
149. Section 45 of the Welfare Assistance Regulations 1976, P.E.I.
Reg. EC 865/76.
150. Subsection 12 (a) - see S.O. 1972, c.12 section 1.
151. Subsection 10(3).
152. Paragraph 22 (c) of Social Assistance Regulations, 1978.
153. Subsection 11(2) the Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg.
50/78.
154. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-35.
155. Information supplied by Mr. M.J. Vincent, Director of Social
Assistance in a letter dated April 21, 1981.
156. See manual, supra note 138, no. 74, p. I where it is stated that
"cases of apparent fraud are referred for investigation under the
Criminal Code of Canada"
157. See figures for 1978-79 and 1979-80, supra Table 4.
158. See note, 1 Low Income Law (No. 3) 6 (1980).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g. R, v. Thurrolt (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 129, in which the
Ontario Court of Appeal stated: "Although the case is pitiful in
many respects, this Court is unanimously of the opinion that the
paramount consideration in determining the sentence is the element of deterrence," p. 129.
162. See the Fisher Report, supra note 2, p. 158, para. 367.
163. See Provincial Secretariat for Justice Ontario, Justice Statistics
Ontario 1978, mimeo, 1978, Table 7.7, Use of Ontario Jails and
Adult Institutions and Net Per Capita Per Diem Costs, Fiscal
Year 1977-78, pp. 127-28.
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

THE CRUEL WAR

the cost of incarcerating the claimant.
The third reason why imprisonment is not a satisfactory sentence is because it is likely to impose enormous psychic costs on the claimant and his or her
children. Some of the consequences of a prison sentence
on a mother and her child can be seen from a British Columbia case. 1 6 4 In February 1981, Florence Kemp was
sentenced to ninety days in jail by a New Westminster
County Court judge for failing to report $2,674 which
she earned as a homemaker.1 65 As a result of the conviction, Ms Kemp cannot be bonded to work as a homemaker. Further, Ms Kemp's ten-year old daughter is seeing a psychologist paid for by the provincial government. The daughter is in the care of the Ministry of
Human Resources because she could not stand the stress
of the court case and because she blamed herself for her
mother's problems. Ms Kemp is serving her sentence on
Saturdays at the Oakalla Women's unit in Burnaby. She
needs $15 to take a taxi to get there, because there is no
bus service to the prison from her home. This money
comes from her food allowance. A system of degradation for the claimant and suffering for dependents seem
to be virtually certain features of the consequence of using imprisonment for offences of this type.' 66

Most welfare statutes are silent on the
question of procedural protection for the
welfare recipient who has been cut off.
It would be a beneficial step if prison sentences
were to be abolished for welfare offences. Such a
measure would not be a radical step even by Canadian
standards since this is close to the position in Newfoundland at the present time.167 The high conviction
rate in that province must be seen, in part, as a reflection of an extremely large welfare population.16 Further, the conviction rate in Newfoundland has dropped
from 109 in 1978 to 91 in 1979 and from 91 to 37 in
1980.169 These figures seem to indicate that it is possible
to deter without using jail sentences.
4. The Defence of Necessity?
In R. v. Bourne'7 0 an eminent gynaecologist
aborted a girl of 14 who was pregnant as a result of a
rape. He justified his action on the grounds of the
health of the mother and was acquitted after a
favourable direction by MacNaghten J. The judge
rested his direction on the presence in the statute of the
word "unlawfully" which he took to mean that some terminations of pregnancy were lawful. But the judge also
referred to the choice of values or choice of evils that is
generally known as the doctrine of necessity. The
gynaecologist was acquitted because he was acting to
save the mother's mental and physical health. ' '
If a prolonged period of existence on welfare rates
can also cause grievous harm to a claimant's health and
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

that of his or her children, it is difficult to see why the
defence of necessity should not be available to a claimant who has, say, obtained earnings in excess of the
amount permitted by the welfare legislation.
A powerful picture of the typical welfare offender
was put to the British Committee on the Abuse of Social
Security Benefits by the Family Service Units:
All the cases of abuse described by FSU workers occurred in
families living for long periods on extremely low incomes,
one third in single parent families with the additional
stresses experienced. The vast majority were, in the opinion
of the workers not 'rogues' wilfully abusing social security
but ordinary claimants either unknowingly or in desperation making wrongful claims in order to ease unbearable
situations, created in the main by the vicious circle of long
term poverty and in some instances by personal problems
including psychiatric ill health. 172

Similarly, the Edinburgh Council on Social Service
told the same Committee, "In general, we feel that the
majority of people who resort to such devices to defraud
the [Supplementary Benefits] Commission do so out of
the necessity to obtain an income at subsistence level
rather than from irresponsible choice." 7 3
The plight of the welfare claimant as described by
the Family Service Units and the Edinburgh Council on
social service seems to be as desperate as that of the 14
year old girl in the Bourne case. The difference in the
two cases seems to be that the poor are not allowed to
take the law into their own hands because it does not
recognize the necessity to eat.174 It seems bizarre, to say
the least, to allow preservation of mental health as a
defence, as was done in Bourne, but to say that the
preservation of mental health is not a defence if the
threat to one's mental health arises through hunger.

164. See the Globe and Mail, April 9, 1981, p. T-6.
165. Leave to appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal was
denied.
166. Note, in this connection, the remarks of Lord Kilbrandon who
said, "We know quite well that conviction and sentence and imprisonment are liable to result in severe personal deterioration.
That is why the task of rehabilitation in a prison is so difficult.
The two things are mutually destructive on one another," in
Dentention: The Report of a Conference Chichester: British Institute of Human Rights, (1975) quoted by Judge MacKenna in
Glazebrook, ed., Pleafor ShorterPrison Sentences in Reshaping
the Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 1978), pp. 422, 425, fn. 7.
167. See text at supra note 164.
168. According to Mr. George Pope, Assistant Deputy Minister for
Social Services in the Province cheques are sent out to 30,000 individuals and families every year. Information provided by
telephone, August 14, 1981.
169. See supra Table 4.
170. [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
171. The defence of necessity was recognized by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Morgentalerv. The Queen [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616. For
a brief discussion see Leigh, "Necessity and the Case of Dr.
Morgantaler," [1978] Crim. Law Review 151.
172. See the Fisher Report, supra note 2, p. 158, para. 367.
173. Id., emphasis not in the original.
174. For a discussion of how narrowly the defence has been applied
see G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Stevens,
1978), ch. 24.
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There is no reason why Canadian courts should feel
bound by ancient English authorities which make
nonsense of the defence.
The adoption of a defence of necessity would not
be a radical departure in the light of a decision such as
Said'I 5 where the claimant was put on probation despite
the failure to report a common law husband and a year
of employment, or Perry'7 6 decided by the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, where the accused received
a two year suspended sentence despite having obtained
$9,200 over a period of sixteen months. It is true that exceptional circumstances were found to exist in both
cases but 'exceptional circumstances' will be found in
many (if not most) cases of welfare fraud prosecution.

[T]he unavailability of child care
facilities in many parts of Canada makes
it practically impossible for female heads
of families to find jobs.
I am not suggesting that the defence of necessity is
the answer to the problems of the 'delinquent' welfare
client. It is too uncertain in its application to be considered an altogether satisfactory weapon. But until
welfare rates are raised, at least, to poverty lines and
made inflation-proof, the defence of necessity can save
some individuals from the vagaries of the criminal process. These people are already incurring sufficient
punishment by living at unacceptable levels of deprivation.

Interim Conclusion
The number of convictions for welfare fraud is extremely low. It is possible that the reason for this extremely low conviction rate is to be found in an extremely generous exercise of prosecutorial discretion but this
seems unlikely in view of the fact that, say for example,
jail sentences have been asked for (and secured) in the
case of pregnant women. '7 A more likely explanation is
that most welfare recipients are disabled, elderly or
female - heads of one-parent families. In 1977-78 these
three groups accounted for 80 percent (36 per cent, 8 per
cent and 35 per cent respectively) of the welfare case
load.17 8 Because these groups find it extremely difficult
to find work in the paid labour force, they are not able
to commit the most common type of welfare offence,
the failure to report outside earnings. In addition, it is
difficult for the disabled and the elderly to run foul of
the cohabitation rules. It might also be surmised that
these handicapped groups are particularly afraid of
breaking the law.
What is disturbing about the convictions is the lack
of any uniform treatment of offenders. In particular, it
seems impossible to justify the use of imprisonment
which degrades but does not deter, is expensive to ad132

minister, and which may do severe damage to relation-

ships between claimants and their children.

Workshyness
For most believers in widespread welfare abuse,
workshyness would perhaps be thought of as being the
most common form of abuse. Workshyness is not a
problem among welfare claimants for the same reason
that welfare fraud is not a serious problem among
welfare claimants.
If we accept the fact that 80 per cent of welfare
claimants are disabled (36 per cent), elderly (8 per cent)
or female heads of one-parent families (35 per cent),"'
then employment opportunities will be extremely hard
to come by for these groups, particularly in a society
which has abandoned full employment as a goal. It is
true that women with children could be declared employable and Alberta has done this with women who
have children older than four months,s 0 but the
unavailability of child care facilities in many parts of
Canada makes it practically impossible for female heads
of families to find jobs.
So far as employables on welfare are concerned,
The Report of the Task Force on Employment Opportunities for Welfare Recipients (Swadron Report)'8 ' found that employables were under a duty to
seek any employment which they were capable of performing. It is irrelevant that the employment in question
requires lesser skills and lower remuneration than the
person might usually expect.1 8 2 Indeed, a claimant
could not refuse a job because union rules forbade him
or her from taking the job.'8 I The one concession to a
claimant is that she or he is not required to accept a job
in any plant where there is a strike or a lockout.
A claimant who leaves a job shortly after accepting
it runs the risk of being cut off welfare for not making
reasonable efforts to secure employment.184 The claimant also runs the risk of being declared ineligible for
refusing an offer of employment.' 8 5 Because it felt that

175. See text at supra note 168.
176. See 1 Low Income Law (No. 3) 6 (1980).
177. See, e.g., Ashdown, supra note 160 and cases such as Thurrolt,
supra note 161 where a custodial sentence was imposed on a
mother with four children.
178. See the National Council of Welfare, supra note 145, p. 82.
179. Id.
180. See Alberta Social Services and Community Health, Social Services: Income Security Programs(Edmonton, 1980), p. 1.
181. See The Report of the Task Force on Employment Opportunities
for Welfare Recipients (Swadron Report) (Toronto, 1972).
In his letter to Mr. Rene Brundle, then Minister of Social and
Family Services, Mr. Swadron wrote: "Our Terms of Reference
embrace some of the most vital and controversial issues of our
times."
182. Id., p. 51.
183. Id.
184. Id., pp. 51-52.
185. Id., p. 52.
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their powers are capable of being abused by the Welfare
Administrator, the Swadron Report recommended that
every refusal and termination of General Assistance
should be accompanied by a written notice explaining
the existence of the Social Assistance Review Board with
an explanation of how to appeal to the Board.'1 6
The report commented on a kind of workshyness
which it described as rational. This kind of workshyness
occured after a welfare claimant had incurred a substantial amount of debt and then found a job; such a claimant might find that she or he could then have 30 per
cent of her or his wages garnisheed. An attempt to
escape to a different job brought no relief as garnishee
followed garnishee. In the end, welfare offers relief
since welfare payments cannot be garnisheed."
The report was not as sympathetic to the workers
who found that certain kinds of work were demeaning
or exploitative. The report merely noted that it was difficult to obtain agricultural workers, fruit pickers and
field hands and said no more.'II The report failed to inquire into what ways claimants found these jobs unsatisfactory. Had it done so, it might have been able to
suggest ways of making these jobs more attractive. It
might be that a considerable improvement in pay
together with improved living conditions might improve
employment stability.
The lesson of the Swadron Report, and others of
its kind, 19 is that they demonstrate that the problem of
the workshy employable welfare claimant is best seen as
one of employment barriers. The first barrier is lack of
education. The Canadian Council on Social Development report entitled Men on Relief found that 74 per
cent of their respondents in Ottawa had attained less
than grade 8 education and the figures for men from
Winnipeg and Edmonton were 68 per cent and 55 per
cent respectively.1 90 Further, most of these men were
unskilled and many of them did not speak English as a
mother tongue.' 9 '

anyone on welfare would be interested.' 9 A letter from
a large service industry expressed considerable reluctance about offering employment to persons presently
on social welfare "because the hotel field is not a high
paying industry!"' 9 4
A fourth barrier to employment for welfare recipients is that unions are not prepared to waive their
membership fees. The Swadron Report recommended
that trade union requirements regarding the payment of
fees should be made more flexible so that an individual
could be given the opportunity to pay his fees over a
period of time.' 9 5 In my view, such an arrangement

A third problem with the present
maintenance system is that it makes
criminals of those spouses who cannot or
will not pay.
does not do justice to the interests of the union; it may,
legitimately, fear that the cost of debt-collecting may be
too high, both in terms of time and in terms of dues lost.
A much more satisfactory solution would be for the
welfare officer to furnish the claimants with money to
pay union dues. Even if this money were paid to the claimant as a loan, this would be preferable to saddling the
union with the costs of collection.
A similar approach should be taken to the fifth barrier to the employment of welfare claimants - the problem of bonding.' 9 6 Employers are increasingly requiring that their employees be bondable, i.e., acceptable to
a surety company. The only realistic way of overcoming
this barrier is for the welfare department to act as
bondsman for welfare claimants.
The final barrier to claimants getting jobs is the
poor state of job counselling and job-training
facilities.' 19

Most employable welfare claimants find
themselves facing numerous hurdles in
the search for even low-paying jobs.

The second barrier to these workers finding
employment is, as the CCSD report points out, the
absence of any government commitment to a full
employment policy. The report advocated training and
financial assistance be given to "hard to place"
unemployed persons. But the report concluded that
even substantial assistance was unlikely to produce
lasting benefits in the absence of full-employment
policies. 192
The third barrier is imposed by employers who do
not think of employees who are on welfare as suitable
employees. For example, the task force received a letter
from a large northern forest enterprise advising that it
required equipment operators but it did not think
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

186.
187.
188.
189.

190.
191.
192.
193.

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id., p. 55.
Id., p. 63.
Id., p. 64.
See Canadian Council on Social Development, Men on Relief
(Ottawa, 1972); and Barber, Welfare Policy in Manitoba: A
Report To the Planning and PrioritiesCommittee of the CoJoint Secretariat, Province of Manitoba (Winnipeg, 1972).
See Men in Relief, id., p. 21.
Id., p. 52.
Id., p. 55.
See the Swadron Report, supra note 181, p. 80. Some of the
other paper and pulp firms were more aggressive. Thus, one
company told the task force, "It seems too that people on welfare
rolls lack the drive to go out after a job and hence they lack the
competence to fill them," p. 79.
Id.
Id.
Id., p. 82; the report recommended that the provincial government make special provision for bonding.
Id., p. 90.
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The stereotype of the teenager living off comfortable welfare benefits while avoiding work is, for practical purposes, irrelevant to the reality which most
employable welfare claimants face. Most employable
welfare claimants find themselves facing numerous
hurdles in the search for even low-paying jobs. I have
tried to describe some of these hurdles above. The
significant fact is that all levels of government, federal,
provincial and municipal, are doing very little to remove
these obstacles. But until determined action is taken in
this field, the best that welfare claimant employables
can hope for is a series of unsatisfactory jobs of very
short duration. To call this 'workshyness', is a classic example of 'blaming the victim'.

Overpayments
Another alleged abuse of the welfare system is that
of overpayments. The assumption that is made here is
that welfare recipients know exactly how much they are
entitled to. What evidence we have suggests that this
assumption is false. 198
Quebec is the only province which provides the claimant with relief from an administrative error. Section
8.03 of the Regulation on Social Aid provides that, "No
repayment shall be exacted from a person... to whom
aid was paid due to an error for which he is not responsible."' 9 9 The Ontario Family Benefits manual also excuses claimants from having to repay overpayments that
result from administrative error 200 but a statement in
this form has no legal effect.
Two provinces have extremely severe provisions for
overpayments. Nova Scotia, provides in subsection
33(3) of the Social Assistance Appeal Regulations that
once the Social Assistance Appeal Board has determined the existence of an overpayment, the Board may not
order that the overpayment be forgiven or waived. 20 1
Even more remarkably, British Columbia, under subsection 34(11) of the Guaranteed Available Income for Need
Regulations 2 02 prevents a claimant from obtaining as a
matter of right "a retroactive adjustment to benefits for
any time prior to the date of the tribunal's decision." 2 03
This provision makes no attempt to achieve fairness; its
only rationale is that it cuts costs.
In Redding v. Burlington County Welfare
Board,2 04 the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to
allow country welfare boards to recover overpayments
because, in the Courts words, "We are dealing with the
poor and disadvantaged who, for the most part, eke out
a marginal existence on their meager earnings supplemented by AFDC assistance. Invariably, nothing is left
over at the end of the month. They should not be held
responsible for an administrative error unless the
legislature says that this should be done." 2 05
The Redding decision, rightly, recognizes that a
policy of making welfare recipients repay overpayments
defeats the state policy of providing welfare recipients
with minimum benefits at monthly (or other) intervals.
Since it is totally unrealistic for welfare families living
considerably below any of the recognized poverty lines
134

to save any money, a policy of recovering overpayments
must mean that individuals and families will be living at
a level below that fixed by the province. When it is
realized that living at that level may seriously harm individals and children, it is clear that our law relating to
overpayments in welfare cases is in need of radical
change.

PART IV
WELFARE CLAIMANT
THE
ABUSE OF
Allegations of widespread fraud and workshyness
on the part of welfare claimants help conceal areas
where the law abuses welfare claimants. In the remaining part of this paper I will outline some of these abuses.
1. The Wide Range of Civil Penalties
In an earlier section, I made mention of the very
wide scope of the criminal law in this area. The very
wide scope of the criminal law has its parallel in the extraordinary powers given to the welfare departments.
The first example of these powers is the power
found in the statutes of six provinces 2 06 to penalize
welfare claimants who make, or who have made, improvident dispositions of property up to three (or five)
years before they went on welfare. An example of this
kind of provision is to be found in section 7 of the
regulations under the Ontario Family Benefits Act
which provides:
Where, within three years preceding the date of application,
or at any date subsequent thereto, an applicant or recipient
or the spouse of an applicant or recipient has made an
assignment or transfer of liquid assets or real property and,
in the opinion of the Director, the consideration for the

198. See, e.g., Kuyek, Noonan and Martha, "The Right to Welfare in
Ontario," I Queen's Intramural Law Journal 99 (1969). After
observing how assistance rates were calculated, the authors
observed: "There was not evidence of a welfare officer explaining what the recipient's general position was under the Act, and
how that assistance was calculated," (p. 120).
199. Reg. 75-670. This still leaves open the possibility that a claimant
may have to make a repayment when he or she has made an innocent error.
200. See manual, supra note 137, No. 64, p. 1.
201. Social Assistance Appeal Regulations, Nov. 25, 1975.
202. B.C. Reg. 479/76.
203. Someone who had been denied a retroactive adjustment to
benefits, would appear to have no option but to appeal to the
Minister, who would make a decision based on no known
criteria.
204. 65 N.J. 439, 323 A. 2d 477 (N.J. S.C., 1974). This case and the
issues it raises are discussed in the excellent article by Howard,
"Recoupment of Overpayments in A.F.D.C.: Misguided Policy
and Misread Statute," 75 Northwestern University Law Review
635 (1980), to which I am greatly indebted.
205. Id., Redding v. Burlington County Welfare Board, 65 N.J. at
446, 323 A.2d at 481.
206. The provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec,
Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan have such legislation.
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assignment was inadequate the Director may determine that
the applicant or recipient is not eligible for an allowance or
he may reduce the amount of the allowance granted to compensate for the inadequate consideration. 2 0'

Such a provision could be justified to prevent fraudulent transfers of property but, as a commentator has
shown, the section has been used to punish honest
transferors.2 08 In one case, Mr. S was found to be permanently unemployable by the Medical Advisory Board
but an allowance was refused because of a transfer of
the property, in which he resided, to his daughter and
son-in-law. The stated reason for the transfer was that,
because of financial difficulties, he was threatened with
liens against the house and his equity in the house was
only $1,200 to $1,500. His daughter accepted the property, assumed the mortgage and paid off the debts.
The Board held that he did not transfer the property to
qualify for assistance. 2 0 9 In a second case, the appellant
was refused an allowance as a permanently unemployable person under the Family Benefits Act because of
the transfer of a $2000 debenture to his sister. The
Board allowed the appeal, holding that there was adequate consideration as the sister had provided for his
needs for over three years. 2 10 These decisions leave a
great deal to be desired although their outcomes are
satisfactory. In the first place, success in such cases
depends on the claimant's knowledge of the right of appeal; only fifty per cent of welfare claimants in Canada
know that they have a right to appeal an adverse decision. 2 1I Further, among the fifty per cent who do know
of a right of appeal, many will not exercise that right
either because they fear they will not be able to secure an
effective advocate or because they fear that the welfare
office's decision will be rubber-stamped on appeal.
Finally, both decisions make it clear that they turn on
their own special facts. For example, it is by no means
clear that the results would have been the same if the
assets in question had been worth, say, $5000 instead of
$1,200-$1,500 in the first case and $2000 in the second
case. It is intolerable that legal rights, and, in particular,
the legal right to a subsistence income, should depend
on such fine distinctions to be drawn by unaccountable
bureaucrats.
A second example of the extraordinary powers
given to welfare departments is in British Columbia 2 12
and Nova Scotia. 2 13 Powers are given to the Minister
and the Director, respectively, to deny or reduce
benefits in specified instances. In British Columbia any
claimant who "(b) by his misconduct loses his employment or (c) terminates his employment for other than
medical reasons" 214 can have his or her benefits denied
or reduced.
The Nova Scotia provision states that the Director
of Welfare may deny benefits where a claimant (or his
spouse) has quit his or her job without just cause within
a four months period prior to the claimant applying for
welfare benefits. 2 1 5 The effect of these provisions may
well be to leave claimants without either unemployment
insurance or welfare benefits. These provisions can be
understood in the light of these provinces' belief that the
law does not deal as severely as it should with voluntary
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

quitters. As I have tried to show above, the law relating
2 16
to voluntary quits is more severe than it should be.
A third example is Nova Scotia's additional discretionary powers which are frightening in their scope. In
the first place, the Director may refuse to grant or may
reduce benefits to someone who "in the opinion of the
Director dissipates, spends, invests or deals with his
assets in an unreasonable manner." 2 17 Presumably, the
aim here is to prevent alcoholics or drug addicts from
diverting assets from their dependents but it is easier to
devise more narrowly worded legislation that can
achieve the same result. Next the Director may require a
person who is refused benefits to wait for a period between one month and a year before re-applying for benefits under the Act. 2 18 Presumably, this provision is
meant to deal with the vexatious claimant but, again,
the legislation is dangerously wide. It may be a nuisance
if someone appears weekly (or even daily) at the welfare
office claiming welfare benefits to which she or he is not
entitled but to impose, for example say, a six-month ban
on such a person from claiming welfare benefits is a
cruel and dangerous punishment. Someone who does
not need welfare assistance today may be in dire need of
it next week. It is ironic that when one of the problems
in welfare is the failure of welfare claimants to claim
benefits because of feelings of stigma, a provincial
government should have seen fit to erect a legal barrier
to inhibit claimants from submitting their claims. Finally, the Director may, if he or she thinks that a husband
and wife have separated for the purpose of enabling one
or both of them to qualify for benefits, refuse to grant

207. Regulation 318, R.R.O. 1980, section 7.
208. See Mantini, "The Ontario Board of Review: A Further Examination," in 3 Bulletin of Canadian Welfare Law (No. 2) 22 ff.
(1975).
209. Id., p. 25.
210. Id.
211. Civil Liberties Education Trust, Welfare Practises and Civil
Liberties: A Canadian Survey (Toronto: Civil Liberties Education Trust, 1975), p. 81. The United Kingdom Committee on
Welfare Abuse, supra note 2, also found that most welfare recipients did not know of their right to appeal an unfavourable
welfare decision, see p. 173, para. 381.
212. Guaranteed Available Income for Need Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.
158, 1975, section 18.
213. Subsections 12(3) and (4) of the Family Benefits Schedule "B"
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 80/80.
214. The Director also has power to declare ineligible any one who
refuses to accept available employment or fails to demonstrate
that he is making reasonable efforts to secure employment.
Whether the Director has to give the claimant a hearing before
disentitling him/her is not clear.
215. The Director also has power to disqualify anyone who refuses
suitable employment or else, refuses to look for it. As in the case
of British Columbia, it is not clear whether the Director has to
provide the claimant with a hearing.
216. See text at supra notes 84-95.
217. Subsection 39(1) of the Family Benefits Schedule "B" Regulations, N.S. Reg. 80/80.
218. Id., subsection 39(2).
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benefits to either of them.2 19 A provision of this kind is
extremely dangerous. It is not uncommon for marriage
partners to break up, become reconciled and then break
up again. This behaviour might lead one to think that a
fictitious desertion had taken place but unless one heard
the parties and knew a great deal about the relationship,
one could not make any kind of determination as to
whether a fictitious desertion had taken place. Incredibly, the Nova Scotia legislation empowers the Director
to disqualify one (or both) of the spouses from recei(ing
welfare benefits without hearing the parties!2 2 0
These powers are awesome in their scope: they
would be impossible to justify in regard to the use of
land or livestock, let alone human beings who are living
at subsistence level. The failure of lawyers, politicians
and the press to make any statement about these kinds
of powers is a sad commentary on the way that poor
people are viewed in our society.

Table 6
Inflation and Welfare Benefits in Ontario 1975-80
Shortfall
Income
Change
as a percent
of 1980
in 1980
in Purchasing
(1975 dollars)
Power
Incomes

Nature of
Claimant

Income
in 1975

Single
Person
under 65

$3,479

2,842

-637

-22%

Mother with
one child

$5,811

4,970

-841

-16.9%

Mother with
3 children

$8,057

7,110

-947

-13.3%

$8,248

7,098

-1,150

-16.2%

Table 5

Mother,
Father with
2 children

Gap Between Welfare Rater and Poverty Liner
in the Greater Vancouver Area

Mother with
one child

$6,335

5,461

-874

-16%

Mother with
3 children

$8,716

7,718

-998

-12.9%

Mother,
Father with
2 children

$9,020

7,820

-1200

-15.3%

2. Levels of Benefits and Inflation Proofing
The most oppressive feature of Canadian welfare
policy is the extremely low level of benefits. In no province are the benefits tied to any of the poverty lines in
existence. An example of the gulf that exists between

Monthly
Assistance
Rate
1979

Statistics
Canada's
Poverty Line
1979

CCSD
Poverty
Line
1979

Senate
Committee
Poverty Line
1978

Single Unemployable
Male over 45
but under 55

240

440

408

442

Man, Woman
Both aged
30 years

435

Single Female
aged 30
with 8 year
old Boy

435

638

680

737

Woman aged
36 with 2
Children, Boy
10 and Girl 13
years old

560

814

816

884

Woman aged
45 with 3 children: Infant
Boy 2, Girl 5
and a Boy 15
years old

640

969

952

1033

Nature
of Claimant

638

680

737

Source: The Social Planning and Research Department of the United
Way of the Lower Mainland, Measuring the Gap: The Adequacy
of Basic Income Assistance Benefits in the Greater Vancouver
Area (Victoria: Feb. 1980), p. 22.(I have simplified the table a
little).
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welfare rates and various poverty lines is illustrated by
the amounts received by welfare recipients in the greater
Vancouver area (see Table 5).
The situation depicted by those figures is being
made worse by the fact that in seven of the provinces,
welfare benefits are not made inflation-proof.
The results of not inflation-proofing welfare benefits are to be seen from what has happened in Ontario to
welfare recipients between 1975-1980 (see Table 6).

Source: Ontario Welfare Council and the Social Planning Council of
Metropolitan Toronto, ... And the Poor Get Poorer: A Study
of Social Welfare Programs in Ontario (Toronto: Feb. 1981).

Similarly, Brad McKenzie of the University of
Manitoba School of Social Work writing in the summer
of 1981 estimated that welfare recipients in Manitoba
were receiving 12 per cent less for basic necessities than
they received in November 1977 when inflation was
taken into account. This difference is projected to
escalate to 25 per cent before the next scheduled adjustment in January 1982.221
Another factor that has to be taken into account
here is that the number of field workers is not keeping
up with the growth in the welfare population. In Ontario, at the present time, field workers have to carry

219. Section 16 of the Family Benefits Regulations, Reg. 50/78.
220. It is possible that a bold Court would require a hearing under this
section, but it would take an even bolder Court to hold that the
Director had reached a perverse result.
221. See McKenzie, "Playing Politics with Poverty," [1981] Perception, (Spring/Summer) 57.
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work loads of 280 - 400 cases each. 222 As if this were not
bad enough, field workers now are forced to perform
administrative duties once performed by office personnel. It has been estimated that field workers are forced
to spend 60 per cent of their time in the office." As a
result of these heavy case-loads and the fact that field
workers are now mainly office workers, it seems likely
that claimants are not being directed to services and
forms of discretionary assistance which might be
available. In this way, too, the claimant is worse off
than before.
Three provinces (New Brunswick, 2 2 4 Nova
Scotia22 5 and Alberta 226) inflation-proof their welfare
benefits, but it is important to realize the limitations of
inflation-proofing. In the first place, with a rate of inflation in excess of 10 per cent each year, "annual
reviews that make up for past increases in the price index rather than anticipating prospective needs serve only to keep welfare recipients a year behind the current
cost of living." 227 A more equitable method would be to
adjust benefits quarterly.
Second, as the National Council of Welfare report
Prices and the Poor pointed out, "Looking to the
general cPi to tell us about the effect of inflation on lowincome consumers is like relying on the assurance that
the river's average depth is only 18 inches and deciding
to wade across." 228
Since 1972 food prices have gone up more quickly
than general prices and in 1980 food prices rose by 15.2
per cent, 2 29 a sum in excess of the general increase in the
cpi. But even the figure of 15.2 per cent may understate
the rise in food prices for the poor because studies in
Vancouver, Edmonton and Montreal showed that food
prices charged by chain stores were higher in the poorer
areas than anywhere else in the city. 23 0 There is,
therefore, a need to work out a modified Consumer
Price Index that more accurately reflects price increases
for welfare claimants than does the present index.
But the most serious drawback to the system of
inflation-proofing benefits is that automatic increases
mean very little if the base rates are unreasonably low.
What is needed is to first adopt a welfare level that is
based on one of the recognised poverty levels. Second, it
is important to make sure that welfare rates do not fall
too far below average income rates. This can be accomplished by the use of a formula that ties welfare
rates to whichever is the higher of a modified Consumer
Price Index or an increase in the average net earnings.
The adoption of this formula in the United Kingdom
meant that in November 1976 the ordinary welfare rate
for a married couple came to 49.8 per cent of average
net earnings for manual workers, compared with 36.1
per cent in 1948.21

The continuing decline in welfare benefits must be
viewed as a matter of great concern. There may be a
small increase in welfare fraud but even this is problematic. It is more likely that the increased pressures
generated by having to live on increasingly depressed
budgets will be reflected in anti-social behaviour and in
deteriorating standards of mental and physical health.
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3. The Means Test
In 1971 the Federal-Provincial Task Force on
Public Assistance said,
the multiplicity of budgetary requirements and income and
assets that have to be considered in determining need and
the complexities that enter into their assessment contribute
to a lack of understanding, confusion and feelings of
helplessness on the part of recipients.
..... the negative feelings created in the client by the
eligibility process are likely to extend to other services of the
agency as well as to the financial assistance program.. 232

It is true, as Professors Handler and Hollingsworth
have reminded us, 233 the means test is not as offensive
to welfare claimants as the levels of benefit, 23 4 but even
Handler and Hollingsworth show that a substantial
number of claimants felt outrage at the means testing
process.23 5
In Toronto, Jean James's study showed that although most welfare recipients were not bothered by
questions about money and assets, a substantial number
were, and more claimants were upset by questions about

222. See OPSEU, People First-Ontario Family Benefits - A Crisis in
Priorities, mimeo (Toronto, Mar. 1981), p. 2.
223. Id.
224. Subsection 15(2) of the Social Welfare Regulations, N.B. Reg.
80/38.
225. Section 34 of the Family Benefits Schedule "B" Regulations,
N.S. Reg. 80/80.
226. Indexing in Alberta is not statutory. However, during the past
few years welfare benefits have been raised in line with changes
in the Consumer Price Index. Information supplied by Ms.
Patricia Millar, Chief, Income Security Unit, Social Services
Planning Secretariat, Alberta, by telephone July 9, 1981.
227. See Ulmer, "Provincial Social Assistance Benefits: A Comparison," 4 Bulletin of Cdn. Welfare Law 34, (1976).
228. National Council of Welfare, Prices and the Poor (Ottawa, April
1974), p. 4.
229. See statement by Mr. James McGrath in Can., H. of C. Debates,
Dec. 18, 1980, p. 5881. The significance of this figure is
underscored by the fact that the lower a family's income is, the
more it will spend on food. Thus, in 1969 a Statistics Canada
study showed that families with incomes of less than $3,000
spent 27.9% of their income on food, whereas families with incomes over $15,000 spent only 13.4% of their budgets on food.
(See Report, supra note 27, p. 4).
230. See Report, supra note 237, pp. 12-14.
231. Supplementary Benefits Commission, Supplementary Benefits
Commission Annual Report (London: HMSO, 1976), Table 9.6.
232. See Federal-Provincial Task Force on Public Assistance,
Developmental Approach to Public Assistance (Ottawa, 1971),
p. 45. The classic article against the means test is still Broek and
Wilson, "Public Assistance and Social Insurance - A Normative
Evaluation," I UCLA Law Rev. 237 (1954).
233. See Handler and Hollingsworth, "How Obnoxious is the'Obnoxious Means Test'? The Views of A.F.D.C. Recipients," 11970]
Wisconsin L. Rev. 114.
234. The authors, id. at 128, posit the plausible conclusion that the
"social and psychological events requiring people to apply for
assistance so humiliate them and produce such anxiety that
welfare applicants lose or repress feelings of privacy and
outrage."
235. Id. p. 129, Table 2.
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income and assets than were bothered by questions
about their children. The figures are as follows:
Table 7
Perceptions of Questions Relating to Assets
by Toronto Women in Receipt of Family Benefits
Were you bothered
by questions about
money/assets

Were you bothered
by questions about
children

very much
12 %
4.6%
somewhat
18.9%
9.5%
not at all
69.1%
85.9%
Source: J. James, Family Benefits Mothers in Metropolitan Toronto
(Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, Research and Planning Branch Report 2, 1973) p. 105.

The argument in favour of the means test was set
out in the Federal-Provincial Working Party on Income
Maintenance, Background Paper on Income Support
and Supplementation.2 3 6 The argument advanced there
is that it would be unfair to give identical treatment to
two families - Family A, which has $8,000 earned income, and Family B, which has no earned income but
has $100,000 worth of land whose value is increasing at
a rate of 8 per cent a year. If there were to be no means
test, it is argued, Family B would be entitled to claim
welfare benefits, whereas Family A would not be able to
do so and this would create "an equity problem at least
in social policy terms". 37
The difficulty with this example is that it could be
duplicated under present welfare legislation. Again, we
have family A with $8,000 of earned income and not entitled to any welfare benefits. Next door, we have family
B, which has no earned income but which owns their
house for $150,000 and has $100,000 being the cash surrender value on a life insurance policy. Family B would
(if other conditions were met) be entitled to welfare
benefits since the assets it possesses are not "liquid
assets" 238 under Canadian welfare legislation.
But we should not focus too much on hypothetical
families since it is dangerous to build social policy on
situations which are close to being fanciful.
In practice, the means test makes it more difficult
for people to carry on their livelihood after a set-back.
Thus, in an Ontario case, 239 the applicant had at the
time of his application livestock worth about $2,000 and
other farm animals and equipment that were over the
asset limit allowed by the Family Benefits Act.
Although he was in need at the time, the Social Assistance Review Board held that he would be disentitled
from welfare assistance unless those assets were converted to cash and used for his maintenance. It would,
of course, be far more sensible to disregard the assets
and simply deduct the income received from them from
the applicant's entitlement. This would enable the applicant to get off welfare in time. The application of the
means test makes it more likely that the applicant will be
on welfare for an indefinite period of time. Needless to
say, this seems to be very short-sighted social policy.
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Another function of the means test is to perpetuate
the 'cycle of poverty'. The classic example of this effect
is the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re
Fawcett and Board of Review. 240 In that case Mrs.
Fawcett recovered $13,500 in a Fatal Accidents Act
claim. Mrs. Fawcett received $3,500 personally and
$5,000 for each of her two children. One of the children
was made a ward of the Children's Aid Society. The
issue in the case centered around whether the $5,000
Mrs. Fawcett had placed in trust for her son until he
reached maturity could be retained for that purpose, or
whether such assets had to be considered as "liquid
assets" in which case the monies had to be used to maintain Mrs. Fawcett. The Ontario Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of the Social Assistance Review
Board, decided that the monies had to be used to maintain Mrs. Fawcett. The effect of such a decision is "to
exhaust a capital sum, usually of modest amount, that
might have been available to the infant when he reached
eighteen years to help give him a start on the difficult
24
path out of the family welfare cycle." 1
Finally, the means test provisions make it virtually
certain that recipients of welfare will be able to live at
one of the recognized poverty lines for only a limited
period of time. 2 4 2 After that, they will have to live on
welfare rates which are scandalously low at the present
time and which continue to decline annually in seven
provinces.
Unfortunately, the means test gets less examination
and coverage than does, say, welfare fraud or alleged
workshyness. Like so many fundamental parts of our
welfare law, it is in need of radical reform.
4. Outside Earnings
Another abuse faced by welfare claimants is the
fact that the welfare programmes discourage work and
foster dependency. Welfare recipients are allowed only
very small outside earnings. The situation is well
described by David Ross:
Generally, after a recipient's earnings reach a certain level
(usually $75 - $100 monthly), welfare benefits are drastically reduced or completely cut off. Given the low-paying and
insecure nature of most job opportunities facing welfare
recipients, this cold turkey treatment is likely to encourage
people to hang on to the security of the social assistance

236. Federal-Provincial Working Party on Income Maintenance,
Background Paper on Income Support and Supplementation
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
237. Id., p. 26.
238. See Mantini, supra note 208, p. 22.
240. Re Fawcett and Board of Review, [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 772.
241. See criticism by Beck, "Re Fawcett and the Board of Review," 3
Bull. of Cdn. Welfare Law (No. 2) 1,6 (1975).
242. This will be true unless they have assets which by some quirk in
the legislation are not described as 'liquid assets'. These would include the proceeds derived as the result of the sale of a home and
the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy; see text at
supra note 238.
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payments especially as they know they may encounter difficulties and delays in requalifying for welfare benefits.14 1

It is true that there are differences between the
severity of provincial cut-off rates for outside earnings.
Thus, Prince Edward Island allows a single person to
earn $25 a month and a couple to earn $50 a month but
this dispensation only lasts for six months unless the
claimant is employed to pick berries, sell newspapers or

acts as a part-time baby sitter.2 4 4 British Columbia,2 45

Saskatchewan2 4 6 and Manitoba2 47 all allow recipients to
earn $50 a month. New Brunswick 248 allows a recipient
to earn $100 a month and Newfoundland 24 9 allows a
recipient to keep some of his or her income. Alberta 25 0
has a sliding scale whereby the first $75 earned every
month may be retained by the claimant, between $75
and $150 earned thereafter is a tax-back rate of 50 per
cent and between $150 and $250 earned, a tax-back rate
of 75 per cent is applied and finally, on the excess of earnings over $250 a month a tax-back rate of 90 per cent is
applied. Ontario 251 has a scheme similar to Alberta's except that a tax-back rate of 75 per cent is applied after
the applicant has earned $100 a month. Quebec 25 2 applies a 50 per cent tax-back rate for the first month of
work, a 66 2 3 per cent tax-back rate for the second
month and 100 per cent thereafter, where the claimant
has been in receipt of welfare benefits for three consecutive months. In some provinces, attempts have been
made to introduce work incentive programmes but these
are available to only a very small number of claimants.
Further, in Ontario the benefits will last only two years.
Indeed, the Family Benefits Work Group has argued
that after the mother has borne the cost of child care
and the cost of work-related expenses, she will be little
better off than on Family Benefits. 253
In any event, these statutory provisions, whatever
their differences, bear out the correctness of Ross's
statement. The results of applying penal rates of taxation are illustrated in a case study described by the
Canadian Council on Social Development, in their
report entitled The One Parent Family:
With three children in public school and an income of $180
a month this person said that she had been finding it impossible to manage and has borrowed, getting deeper and
deeper in debt. Therefore, she took a job in a factory where
she was paid $1.25 an hour. She had to pay a baby sitter $15
a week so that she was clearing $72 every two weeks. Her
rent in subsidized housing went up from $33 to $50 because
she was working. She could not deduct anything for a baby
sitter. Obviously this plan was not working. She then tried
working on night shift from 4 to 11 p.m., clearing $10 a
week. Her babysitter was clearing more. She gave up the
work at the end of a couple of weeks. She thinks that when
a woman in her position takes a job people like the welfare
department and the housing authority should allow six
months or so to work without having the allowance reduced
and the rent raised. This would give the person a chance to
replenish clothing and pay off debts. She says she also went
to a Canada Manpower training program to upgrade her
schooling and also to business college. Canada Manpower
paid $62 a week. Her rent was raised and her provincial
allowance cut. She concluded that life as a stenographer
would be expensive, with respect to clothes, baby sitting
etc., and yet she seems to feel a great need to get a feeling
that she is improving her situation even slightly.254
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It should not be necessary to create such an obstacle course for those people who wish to make the extremely difficult transition from dependence to independence.
5. The Maintenance Quagmire255
For over one third of the welfare population,
female headed one parent families and deserted
spouses, 5 6 the provincial welfare departments have abdicated their functions by requiring the claimant to first
attempt to claim maintenance from the delinquent
spouse.
The statutes on maintenance may be divided into
two groups. In the first group there are statutes such as

those in Newfoundland,

25 7

Nova Scotia, 25 8 Quebec 25 9

and British Columbia 26 0 which require that the spouse
243. See D. Ross, The Working Poor (Toronto: James Lorimer,
1981), p. 85.
244. Section 15 of the P.E.I. Welfare Assistance Regulation 1976,
R.R. P.E.I. (Consolidated), Cap. W-4.
245. Section 6 of Schedule B of the Guaranteed Available Income for
Need Regulations Reg. 479/76. If the recipient has dependents,
s/he can earn up to $100 a month.
246. Paragraph 28 (2)(d) of the Saskatchewan Assistance Regulations, Sask. Reg. 160/75. A single person can earn the greater of
$50 per month or 25 per cent of his/her allowance. In the case of
a family unit (2 or more persons), the unit is entitled to $100 per
month or 25 per cent of their allowance, if that is greater.
247. See Section 4(1) (B) (C) of the Manitoba Social Allowances Act
Regulations, Man. Reg. 202/77; 77/78 which allows a recipient
to earn the greater of up to $50 per month or 70 cents for each
hour worked or 30 per cent of gross monthly earnings.
248. Section 7(2)(g) of the Social Welfare Regulation N.B. Reg.
74-34, as amended by N.B. Reg. 79-40, paragraph 3(6).
249. Clause 2(e)(ii) of the Newfoundland Social Assistance Regulations, 1978 N.S. Reg. 25/78, allows an adult to keep the first $30
a month tax free; any amount between $30-$80 as a tax-back rate
of 50 per cent. Any amount earned in excess of $80 is taxed at
100 per cent. In the case of a family any amount between $30-200
month is taxed at 50 per cent. Any amount over $200 is taxed at
100 per cent.
250. 1(1) (a) Social Allowance Regulations Alta. Reg. 92/75. These
amounts came into force on April 1, 1981.
251. See Section 3, Reg. 318, R.R.O. 1980 under the Family Benefits
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 151, Welfare Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1980,
c. 188.
252. Regulation 5.04 of the Social Aid Regulations, Que. Reg.
75-670.
253. See Family Benefits Work Group, WIN Program, mimeo
(Toronto, Nov. 1979); see also Ontario Welfare Council, Settling
for Less (Toronto, October, 1979).
254. Canadian Council of Social Development, The One Parent
Family, mimeo (Ottawa, Oct. 1981), pp. 80-81.
255. 1 have borrowed the phrase from the title of Mr. S.M. Cretney's
article in 33 Modern L. Rev. 662 (1970).
256. See text at supra note 178.
257. Section 14 of Social Assistance Regulations 1978, Nfld. Reg.
25/78.
258. Section 15(3) of the Family Benefits "Schedule A" Regulations,
N.S. Reg. 50/78.
259. Section 26 of the Social Aid Act, R.S.Q. 1977, 1 c. A-16.
260. See Province of British Columbia Ministry of Human Resources,
Services Policy and Procedural Manual, October 1977, S4.
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initiate an action against a deserting partner. In the second group, in provinces such as Alberta,2 6 1 New
Brunswick, 262 Prince Edward Island, 263 and Ontario, 264
the Director of Welfare (or other official) is empowered
to bring an action in the name of the deserted spouse to
recover maintenance payments. But there is very good
reason to believe that the difference between the two
kinds of statutes is not great. This is illustrated by the
experiences of Ontario and Alberta. On October 30,
1979, Mr. Keith Norton told the Ontario Standing Committee on Social Development that his Ministry did not
have sufficient resources to bring subrogated actions. 2 65
Further, although the Ontario Family Law Reform
Act 2 6 6 of 1978 empowered the Ministry of Community
and Social Services to bring subrogated actions for
deserted spouses, by August 1979, 16 months after the
passage of the statute, not a single action had been
brought by the Ministry.26 7 It is significant that the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Community and Social
Services advertise the existence of skip-tracing services
which may be used by a deserted spouse. 2 68 In Alberta,
the Institute of Law Research and Reform Research
Project on Matrimonial Support Failures shows that
women are having to pursue maintenance actions
because, as over two-thirds of the women who were interviewed said, they had not received social assistance

during marriage. 2 6 9
The present system has very serious defects. In the
first place, even when payment is forthcoming, the
average amounts paid will be considerably below the
welfare rates. This point was made vividly by the Finer
Committee on Single Parent Families in the United
Kingdom. 2 7 0 Taking figures awarded by Magistrates'
Courts in the United Kingdom between April and June
1971, the committee demonstrated the remarkable gap
between what could be covered on maintenance and
welfare rates. The figures are truly startling (see Table 8).

Table 8
Weekly Maintenance and Welfare Rates in the UK
April-June 1971
Weekly
Maintenance
Amounts
Weekly
Awarded by
WelfareRates MagistrateCourts

Type of
Order

No.of Children

Wife only
Wife
Wife
Wife
Wife

Nil
& I child
& 2 children
& 3 children
k 4 children or
more

f 8.20
9.70
11.20
12.70
15.70

f 3.89
6.06
9.33
10.72
12.75

1

9.70
11.20
12.70
15.70

3.05
5.45
7.87
8.98

Children
Children
Children
Children

only
only
only
only

2
3
4

Source: Report of the Committee on Single Parent Families (Finer
Report) (Cmnd. 5629, 1974), vol. 1, p. 104, Table 4.10.
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What these figures mean is that the mother has to
make frequent visits to court, perhaps travelling a considerable distance with several small children and
perhaps having taken time off from work. After she has
been through all these obstacles, she finds that she has
to make a further journey to seek a social security payment. It is difficult to believe that results would be any
different in Canada. Thus, in Manitoba, Barber reports
in his Welfare Policy in Manitoba that "the majority of
women reported not knowing their husband's income
before losing support. Those who were able to give this
information reported an average income of $5,000, only
slightly above the Economic Council of Canada Poverty
27
level." '1
The next problem is that most orders are not regularly complied with. The Finer Committee estimated
that 55 per cent of orders were irregularly complied with
as compared to 45 per cent of orders that were regularly
complied with. 27 2 The Law Reform Commission of
Canada in its paper entitled Maintenance on Divorce
reported that the records for the City of Calgary Family
Court showed that 85 per cent of all maintenance orders
were in default to some degree and 50 per cent of the
cases were in default by a very substantial degree. 27 3 It
is true that British Columbia, 27 4 Nova Scotia 27 5 and
Ontario 276 relieve a spouse from having to seek
maintenance for a defined number of reasons but one of
those reasons is not irregular payment of maintenance.
Thus, a spouse may be relieved of having to bring a
maintenance action if he or she can prove serious health
or emotional problems. This is an extremely uncertain
criterion especially when it is realized that virtually all
spouses who are seeking money that is not likely to
261. Section 12 of the Social Development Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 5-16.
262. Section 8 of the New Brunswick Social Welfare Act, R.S.N.B.,
1973, c. 5-11.
263. Section 34 of the P.E.I. Welfare Assistance Regulations 1976,
R.R. P.E.I. (Consolidated), ch. W-4.
264. See paragraph 18(3)(a) of the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 152.
265. See statement by Mr. Keith Norton, Ont., Standing Committee
on Social Development, Proceedings, (Oct. 30, 1979), p. 16.
266. R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.
267. Information supplied by Ministry of community and Social Services by telephone August 6, 1979.
268. See, e.g., Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services,
49th Annual Report (Desertion Services), (Toronto, 1980), p. 13.
269. See Institute of Law Research and Reform, Matrimonial Support Failures:Reasons, Profiles and Perceptions of Individuals
Involved; Vol. 1 Summary Report (Edmonton: University of
Alberta, 1981), p. 25.
270. Report of the Committee on Single Parent Families (Finer
Report) Cmnd. 5629 (London: H.M.S.O., 1974).
271. Barber, supra note 270, vol. 1, p. 100, para. 4.87.
273 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Maintenance on Divorce
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), p. 21.
274. See Services Policy and Procedure Manual, supra note 260.
275. Subsection 15(4), Family Benefits Schedule "A" Regulations,
N.S. Reg. 50/78.
276. Ministry of Community and Social Services, "Family Benefits
Act, Policy and Procedural Guidelines," July 1, 1980, S.9.
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materialize will be under considerable strain. Requiring
persons to meet this requirement may force them to
disclose intimate private details about themselves. A second case in which a wife will be relieved from taking
proceedings is if she can show that she has been the victim of violence or there is a likelihood of violence ensuing after she has taken proceedings. Again, there is considerable uncertainty here. Does the wife get relief if she
can show that her husband has used violence against her
in the past, although the violence related to a matter
that had nothing to do with maintenance or financial
matters? Or, suppose that the wife gets a call or a letter
from her husband informing her that (the husband)
would prefer imprisonment rather than paying her
maintenance? Is this a threat which indicates that
violence may result? Alternatively, can the wife obtain
relief, on these facts, by arguing that her action is likely
to be futile? The only thing that is certain is that the
answer to these questions is hopelessly uncertain and
that different officials will give different answers to the
same question. To take one final example, the wife is
relieved from having to take action for support where
she can show that she would incur unreasonable expense, "particularly in areas where distances are
great." 2 7 This escape hatch also raises numerous questions. First, is the wife obliged to seek legal aid? Second,
what are "great distances"? If a woman lives in Toronto
and her husband is working in Windsor, is that "too
great a distance"? How about Sudbury, Winnipeg or
Calgary? Is it relevant to the question, that although the
distance is great, it is reported that her husband is earning a very substantial salary in, say, Calgary? One cannot envy those people who have to make such enquiries
or the officials who have to answer them.
A third problem with the present maintenance
system is that it makes criminals of those spouses who
cannot or will not pay. Thus, in Newfoundland over the
past three years, almost as many people have been convicted of failing to maintain dependents as have been
convicted of obtaining money fraudulently. The figures
are as follows:
Table 9
Comparison of Convictions for Failure to Provide for Dependents
and for Claimants who Obtained Benefits Fraudulently
Year
1978
1979
1980
Total

Convicted of
Failure to Provide

Convicted of Obtaining
Benefits Fraudulently

87
60
40

109
91
37

187

228

Source: Information supplied by Mr. M.J. Vincent, Director of Social
Assistance in a letter dated April 21, 1981.

The Finer Committee noted that in 1972 criminal
proceedings were taken against 604 men for failure to
maintain persons for whom they were liable under the
Ministry of Social Security Act. 2 78 585 convictions were
CANADIAN TAXATION/FALL, 1981

obtained and 114 men received prison sentences.2 7 9 The
imposition of criminal penalties does not seem to accomplish much for the wife and her children. In the first
place, some (if not many) of the men being exposed to
criminal sanctions are not realistically able to pay
maintenance. Second, even in the case of men who are
able to pay, it is difficult to see any moral basis for imposing an obligation of support for a spouse (or exspouse) which may run for twenty or thirty years. 28 0 If
substantial property has been acquired during the marriage, that property should be divided equally since this
division, almost invariably, will come close to recognizing the contributions the parties have made to the marriage.
The obligation on the part of the father to pay
maintenance in respect of children stands on a different
footing since making the father pay is to enforce his
obligation, whereas the mother on welfare makes her
contribution through unpaid labour on behalf of the
child. It is important, however, as Professor Chambers
has argued in his book Making FathersPay28 ' that this

In the end, the cessation of the war is not
only an ethical imperative; it is also practical politics.

obligation be imposed only on those fathers who earn
more than enough for their own subsistence.
A special word needs to be said about the position
of the unmarried (or divorced) mother who refuses to
make a declaration of paternity. In a series of cases,
welfare departments have refused to grant an allowance
to the newborn child when the mother refuses to name
the father. In an Ontario case, the Social Assistance
Review Board held that this practice is illegal. 28 2 Despite
this decision, the Family Benefits Manual states that a
worker must first determine whether the reason for failing to name the father is "valid". This requirement
formed no part of the Social Assistance Review Board's
decision and is hopelessly vague. Presumably, it is a
'valid' reason to fail to name the father if the mother
fears violence. But is it a valid reason to fail to name a
married man with a family? If the answer to this question is 'yes', does it make any difference if he is
separated from his wife? Is it 'valid' to protect the father

277.
278.
279.
280.

Id., p. 4.
Ministry of Social Security Act, 1966 c.20, s.30 (U.K.).
See the FinerReport, supra note 270, vol. 1, p. 146, Table 4.13.
See Fodden, "Dependent Wives and The Requirement to Sue,"
3(1) Bull. Cdn. Welfare Law 22 (1974).
281. D. Chambers, Making FathersPay (Chicago: U. Chicago Press,
1979).
282. See aote "Re Unwed Mother Who Refuses to Name Father," 2(2)
Bull. Cdn. Welfare Law 41 (1973).
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who is still at high school? How about the university
student? In the latter case, will it make a difference if
the university student is wealthy or is earning a salary?
Discretion of this kind would be regarded as unacceptable in any branch of the law; in the area of welfare law
the exercise of this kind of power does not seem to raise
any comment despite the fact that what is being done is
immoral and illegal.
If the mother does not give a 'valid' reason she may
be declared ineligible for benefits or she may have her
benefits reduced. If, however, the mother gives a 'valid'
reason, welfare benefits may be granted without any reduction or the mother may, if her reason is "extremely
valid" be given a waiver which exempts her from ever
having to name the father. 28 3 The nice balancing of
equities involved in this attempt to find true justice
might make some sense to those persons who are familiar with the criteria to be used in determining what is a
"valid" reason for failing to name the father, but to outsiders, the exercise appears to be capricious in the extreme.
In one province, the social service form asks the
mother to name the father, his address and physical
description, the date of her last menstrual period and
dates of sexual intercourse. The Edmonton Journal
described the procedures used as requiring a "sexual
diary" 28 4 from the mother.
In my view, it is improper to deny welfare benefits
to a mother who refuses to name the father of her child.
She is at least as likely to be able to recognize a 'valid'
reason as a social worker. But even in the extreme case,
where a mother fails to name a father for no particular
reason, a policy of denying her benefits does great harm
to the child and this seems to me to be an intolerable
cost, particularly when it is realized that even if the
father is apprehended he may not be able to support the
child in any event. It is possible to argue that a mother
who fails to name the child's father should have the
child taken away from her but this is a cruel and
senseless solution. Mothers are deprived of the care of
their children if they are shown to be unfit parents and
this solution would take away children from many
mothers who would qualify as extraordinarily dedicated
and affectionate parents.
6. Strikers and Welfare
At the time of the enactment of the Canada
Assistance Plan Act, the view of the federal government
was that persons on strike should be entitled to welfare
payments since the cause of need was to be treated as ir-

relevant. 28 6
At the present time, no province seems to have
adopted this position. Some provinces have no statutory
provisions dealing with the subject and the welfare
manuals are likewise silent on the subject. Other provinces have no statutory provisions on the subject but
the welfare manuals provide very limited assistance for
strikers and their dependents. Finally, there are some
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provinces which simply state that they do not provide
welfare assistance to strikers.
Two provinces, Quebec and Prince Edward Island,
deny welfare benefits to strikers. The Quebec provision 2 8 7 is linked in with the provisions of section 44 of
the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 so that a claimant may not claim welfare benefits when there is a
"stoppage of work". Thus, claimants would not be able
to get welfare benefits in the event of a lockout.2 8 8 Furthermore, the bizarre jurisprudence that relates to the
disqualification of those who "finance", 28 9 belong to the
same "grade or class" of workers as those in dispute, 290
and, finally, anyone "interested", 2 9 1 will be applied to
deny claimants welfare.
Prince Edward Island has an incredibly punitive
and dangerous provision. The regulations made under
the Welfare Assistance Act provide that any person who
participates in, or who supports a strike "is ineligible for
any need that existed, either during or after the strike by
reason of his so absenting himself." 2 9 2 This provision
would seem to give the welfare authorities power to
withhold, say, a striker's drug benefit card or an
allowance for a special diet, even after the strike was settled. Any claim that such a policy was motivated by a
desire to maintain neutrality in labour disputes must be
answered by a hollow laugh.
Ontario has no statutory provisions governing the
payment of welfare benefits, but the General Welfare
Assistance manual2 93 provides that a striker will be eligible for welfare benefits provided she or he first terminates employment. Second, the claimant will be
able to get welfare benefits if she or he can show the
welfare administrator that she or he is available for
work and is making reasonable efforts to secure employment. This policy can best be decribed as "neutrality after capitulation." For those workers who do
not capitulate, no regular benefits are payable during a
strike or a lockout. Since the rationale for the disqualification begins by asserting that it would be wrong
to give benefits to strikers, i.e., people not involuntarily
unemployed, it is a little difficult to understand why
workers cannot get welfare during a lockout. The provi-

283. Ministry of Community and Social Services, Family Benefits Act
Manual, January 1, 1980, S. 8, p. 3.
284. See Edmonton Journal, July 22, 1980. The paper had carried an
earlier story on July 19, 1980.
285. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1.
286. See Dyck, "The Canadian Assistance Plan," 19 Cdn. Public Administration 587, 598 (1976).
287. Section 8 of the Social Aid Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 71.
288. See text at supra note 104.
289. See text at supra note 105.
290. See text at supra note 106.
291. See text at supra note 107.
292. Subsection 14(2) of the P.E.I. Welfare Assistance Regulations
1976, R.R. P.E.I. (Consolidated), Cap W-4.
293. Ministry of Community and Social Services, General Welfare
Assistance Act Manual, July 21, 1980, at 0303-05.
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sion of lockouts is added without any explanation. Finally, the manual provides that if a person is in "dire
need", assistance may be issued for a maximum of two
weeks. After two weeks, presumably the expectation is
that the striker will have capitulated and will be searching for another job.

There can be no winners in this war. People who are abused are likely to lose
respect for themselves, and for the society in which they live.
British Columbia has a seemingly generous provision in its welfare statute which allows the Director to
give assistance to claimants whose usual source of income is suspended by reason of a legal strike or legal
lockout. However, this assistance will only be forthcoming -provided that there are no other sources of income,
funds or assets available." 2 9 4 The meaning of the words
quoted becomes clear when one reads in the manual that
no assistance is to be given to strikers "until all credit,
income or liquid assets have been exhausted." 295 The
final shock comes in reading that when welfare is
granted, it is only limited emergency assistance consisting of a few days' food and medical services which
may be rendered. 9 6 It is difficult to envisage any striker
exhausting his or her credit, income and liquid assets to
obtain a few days' food and medical attention. The British Columbia provisions appear to be in the nature of a
cruel hoax.
The Alberta provisions may be stated quite
briefly.197 Strikers are not entitled to welfare benefits
but strikers who were receiving a social allowance supplement to earnings may continue to receive the supplement while on strike. Next, a person on strike who is
unable to provide for his or her dependent children may
apply for social allowance. Temporary assistance available "will be for food only, and will only be issued in exceptional and emergency situations as an alternative to
child protection services. As a measure of control, any
issue for food shall not exceed the entitlement for a one
week period." 2 9 8 It is difficult to believe that strikers
would do worse by resorting to plain charity rather than
using the provincial welfare services.
A limitation on the availability of unemployment
insurance benefits for strikers, although not as wide as
the one in Canada 2 9 9 can be justified provided that the
Federal and Provincial governments attempt to redress
the balance by withholding subisides and other benefits
from employers in dispute. But what has been appreciated in most Western industrialized countries3 0 0 is
that it is intolerable to deny welfare payments to
strikers and their families. To be sure, the details of any
scheme are complex - the British scheme at the present
time is a particularly good example of the compromises
politicians feel they have to make' 0 1 - but the notion
that at least strikers' families should receive welfare
payments seems unchallenged. The thesis advanced by
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Thieblot and Cowin in their book Welfare and Strikes
that the payment of welfare to strikers would destroy
both collective bargaining as well as deplete the funds
available for social welfare is disproved by the evidence
assembled in the book itself. 302
On the other hand, there are very substantial costs
involved in denying trade unionists welfare benefits.
First, the denial of welfare benefits to unionists sets the
tone of the strike as an act of war against the social
order. If unionists see themselves as outlaws, then their
tactics in a strike may be less 'reasonable' than would
otherwise have been the case. It is important to
remember that there has been more violence in Cana30 3
dian labour history than has generally been imagined.
Secondly, the policy of denying welfare benefits to
strikers shows that the provinces are prepared to gamble
dangerously with the health and lives of strikers and
their families, even though there is not the slightest
suspicion of illegality on their part. Such a policy might
have been appropriate in Zola's France or Dickens'
England, but it appears to be horribly atavistic a century
later.
7. Residency Requirement
Paragraph 6 (2)(d) of the Canada Assistance Plan
Act states that a province "will not require a period of
residence in the province as a condition of eligibility for
assistance or for the receipt or continued receipt

thereof."3

04

The spirit, if not the letter, of the section has been
violated by those provinces which have set up municipalities to administer welfare functions.3 0 There have
294. Subsection 3(6) of the Guaranteed Available Income for Need
Regulations, B.C. Reg. 479/76.
295. See the Income Assistance Section of the Services Policy and
Procedures Manual, October 1977, S. 14, para. 4.
296. Id., S. 14, para. 7.
297. Alberta Ministry of Social Services and Community Health,
Social Services: Income Security Programs, October 1, 1980, pp.
11-12.
298. Id., p. 12.
299. See text at supra notes 98-107.
300. See J. Gennard, Financing Strikers (London: MacMillan, 1977),
pp. 30-34.
301. See the extremely complicated provisions on the subject in the
United Kingdom at the present time. See Professor Partington's
helpful article, "Unemployment Industrial Conflict and Social
Security," 9 Industrial Law J. 243 (1980).
302. See Thielbot and Cowin, Welfare andStrikes: The Use of Public
Funds to Support Strikers, Industrial Research Unit Report No.
6 (Philadelphia: U. Penn. Press, 1972).
303. S.M. Jamieson, "Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-1966," Study No. 22 for the
Task Force on Labour Relations, (Vancouver: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of British Columbia, 1968).
304. This section meant a big departure from the Disabled Persons
Act R.S.C. 1970, c. D-6 and the Blind PersonsAct R.S.C. 1970,
c. B-7 which had stipulated a ten-year residence requirement.
305. The provinces which have municipalities administering welfare
functions are Alberta (one municipality only), Manitoba, Nova
Scotia and Ontario.
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been allegations that these municipalities have insisted
on a period of residence of up to twelve months as a
precondition of giving welfare.
But even in situations where the municipality does
not insist on a particular period of residence as a condition for granting welfare, conflicts may arise because, as
David Donnison pointed out in his excellent book Welfare Services in a CanadianCommunity,3 0 6 it sometimes
becomes very difficult to determine which municipality
is responsible for which family. Donnison writes,
"...when families move frequently it becomes very dif-

ficult to decide which municipality is responsible for
them, particularly if they have crossed provincial as well
as municipal boundaries. The families themselves may
be quite unaware that they have moved from one
municipality to another - the area described by most
people as "Brockville" extends well beyond the town
limits and they often cannot remember the exact dates at
which they moved." 0 Even a municipality that accepts
responsibility for a claimant may insist on a period of
residence before granting an item of discretionary or
supplementary aid.3 08
The problem of residence in welfare may well be exacerbated as a result of the operation of the Charter of
Rights. The troublesome section is section 6 which contains the seemingly innocuous "mobility rights" which
enables Canadians to take up residence in any province
and to pursue a livelihoood in any province. The difficulty is that these rights are subject to:
"(b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly
provided social services." 3 09 What an explosive section
that could turn out to be! Will provinces be able to insist
on a six or a twelve month residency requirement? Or
will a six month requirement be unconstitutional for disabled people but valid for deserted spouses or employables on welfare? Unfortunately, no one knows.
Allowing provinces to set up boundaries to the receipt
of welfare is unconscionable. As Donnison has pointed
out, welfare claimants already have enough problems
with municipal boundaries.3 1 0 To add to their difficulties by setting up provincial boundaries to their obtaining welfare benefits is intolerable. The dimensions
of the problem are suggested by Barber's study entitled
Welfare Policy in Manitoba.I" Barber found that 40
per cent of welfare recipients had been born outside
Manitoba; in Winnipeg more than half the welfare recipients were born outside Winnipeg.3 1 2 Barber concluded that the poor are highly mobile.'
If the 'mobility'
clause of the Charter of Rights comes into effect, the
poor will have to learn that 'mobility' is another good
that is being rationed for them.
8. Home Visits
There has been considerable disquiet expressed during the past few years on the question of home visits (or
welfare searches). 3 14 Only one statute appears to deal
with the problem. Subsection 8(2) of the regulations
under the Ontario General Welfare Assistance Act pro144

vides that: "In determining the eligibility of an applicant... a welfare administrator shall make or cause to be
made a visit to the home of the applicant for the purpose of enquiring into the living conditions and financial and other circumstances of the applicant." 3 ' The
section leaves all kinds of questions unanswered. Clearly a visit to the claimant's home is permitted to establish
eligibility but are subsequent visits allowed after the
claimant has established eligibility? It is doubtful if a
case challenging these post-eligibility searches would be
brought. If one were, it would probably suffer the same
fate as the challenge to warrantless home-searches did in
Wyman v. James.3 16 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that warrantless searches were constitutional because they were 'rehabilitative' rather than
'punitive'. It seems likely that a similar result would be
reached in Canada.
In any event, the practice of not making appointments before visits (or searches) are made continues.
The figures found by the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association in this regard are revealing:
Table 10
Home Visits Without Notice
in Selected Canadian Cities
City

No Notice Given of Visit

Toronto
Hamilton
Halifax
Winnipeg
Fredericton

164 or 49% out of a sample of 330
30 or 36% out of a sample of 82
54 or 55% out of a sample of 102
23 or 23% out of a sample of 102
42 or 69% out of a sample of 61

Source: Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, Welfare Practices
andCivil Liberties:A Canadian Survey (Toronto, 1975), p. 36.

Welfare workers are prepared to concede that there
306. D. Donnison, Welfare Services in a Canadian Community
(Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1954).
307. Id., p. 101.
308. Thus, Niagara Municipality provides a large number of benefits
to claimants who satisfy six-month residency requirements: information provided by Mr. M.G. Fraser, Director of Social Services, August 11, 1980.
309. Compare with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) which held that states
cannot impose residency requirements as a condition for granting welfare.
310. See text at supra note 307.
311. Barber, supra note 189.
312. Id., p. 33.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., reports in the Toronto Star, April 6, 1980 and in the
same paper December 7, 1980. The best discussion of home visits
is by Wickham, "Restricting Home Visits: Toward Making the
Life of the Public Assistance Less Public," U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188
(1970).
315. Regulation 441, R.S.O. 1980.
316. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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are times when recipients expressly objected to their
visits. One welfare worker, for example, recalls a situation when his visit coincided with the visit of the recipient's friends. The recipient took exception to the
worker's being there because he did not want his friends
to know he was on welfare."'
A large amount of the dissatisfaction that arises in
this arises because of the attempt to make one individual
- the social worker - play two roles - that of social

officer providing rehabilitative benefits, as well as the
role of the fraud investigator. Inevitably, the social
worker becomes confused about his or her role and
quite soon the social worker will be perceived by welfare
claimants as a part of the fraud squad. The provincial
governments also have strong pressures to downplay the
rehabilitative functions the social workers play and to
view them increasingly as welfare fraud squad officers.
In the first place, once provinces feel they should curtail
spending on social services, there is a tendency to accentuate the role of fraud squad officer. In the second
place, some governments, particularly British Columbia
and Manitoba, have made a considerable political committment to detecting and punishing welfare fraud.
The decline of the rehabilitative ideal is best seen in
a remarkable document issued by the Co-ordinator for
Income Assistance Procedures in British Columbia on
June 3, 1980.318 This document is clearly a manual for
the detection of fraud. It states inter alia:
... Home visits are too often a haphazard thing, done by appointment and thereby offering a chance to set up fictictious residency.
Home visits should not be patterned to exact hours except
in isolated cases.
Be alert to several clients in one building exchanging (rent)
3
receipts. ''
It is suspected in many cases that unreasonably low (rental)
rates (are) charged to divert our attention from a commonlaw situation or so the client will not be deducted for that
income.
... staff (are) to ensure that rates being charged are in line
with local rates. 320

Most of the circular is concerned with ways of
detecting fraud. There is very little on rehabilitative services. One sentence on the rehabilitation sections stands
out: "Rotate the caseload periodically to avoid too
much favouritism." 3 2 1 A frequent rotation of case
workers may seriously jeopardise rehabilitation since
there are likely to be frequent breaks in continuity and
the claimant is liable to feel that she/he is always making fresh starts. Another sentence in the rehabilitation
section stresses the need for "A comprehensive training
course for F(family) A(assistance) W(orkers) stressing
accountability in the handling of public funds more
than the social aspect. Too many let their hearts rule
their thinking." 322 This sort of language says nothing intelligent about rehabilitation; it does, however, have a
lot to do, say, with regard to the desire of the province
to save money.
It seems clear that just as a single individual cannot
be both a probation officer and a policeman, so a social
worker cannot be a welfare counsellor and a policeman
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at the same time. The only solution is to have two
classes of social worker; the first would provide rehabilitation and counselling services and would not be concerned with the detection of possible violations of the
law. No warrant would be necessary but if a home visit
were to take place, a postcard should be sent notifying
the claimant of the social worker's time of arrival. If the
claimant preferred a meeting at the welfare office,3 23
she or he should be sent a postcard setting up a time for
an appointment.
The second type of social worker would be entrusted with the detection and prosecution of fraud. In
his or her case a warrant showing "probable cause"
should be required.
Until these changes are effected, social workers are
going to continue to perform impossible tasks. At the
same time the scope of rehabilitation services will shrink
and the welfare claimant will view the social worker as
an unfriendly policeman. 32 4 The architects of our social
policy do not seem to be aware of these problems.
9. The Welfare Claimant's Right of Appeal
Businessmen, landowners, taxpayers and other
people are frequently notified of their right to appeal an
adverse decision. Such a courtesy is not extended to
welfare claimants, despite the fact that this step was
recommended by the Canadian Council on Social Development in their review of appeal procedures.3 25
In 1975, the Canadian Civil Liberties Education
Trust found that close to 50 per cent of Canadians on
welfare did not know of their right to appeal an unfavourable welfare decision3 2 6 (SEE TABLE I I).

317. Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, Welfare Practicesand
Civil Liberties: A Canadian Survey (Toronto, 1975), p. 37.
318. British Columbia Co-ordinator for Income Assistance Procedures, mimeo (May 28, 1980).
319. Id., p. 3, para 4.
320. Id., p. 5, para 14.
321. Id., p. 6, under "Further Recommendations"
322. Id.
323. In her survey of welfare recipients in Montreal, Barbara Heppner found that some of the welfare recipients preferred to meet
their social workers at the welfare office, because they were
ashamed of the apartments in which they lived; see her book,
The Recipient and The Welfare System Living on Welfare in
Montreal (Montreal: McGill School of Social Work, 1974).
324. Commentators are already beginning to raise the issue of
whether social workers are bound to give claimants the same procedural safeguards as the police afford criminal suspects; see,
e.g., Smith, "Social Workers and the Judges Rules," [19781 J. of
Social Welfare Law 155 (1978).
325. Canadian Council on Social Development, Appeal Procedures
under the Canada Assistance Plan Act (Ottawa, 1972). The
report gave high marks only to Quebec for their attempts to explain how the system of reviews and appeals worked and their efforts in trying to explain how benefits were calculated: id. p. 15.
326. The Royal Committee on the Abuse of Social Security Benefits
found that the same percentage of welfare recipients did not
know of their right to appeal an unfavourable decision: see the
Report, supra note 2, p. 173, para. 381.
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Table 11
Welfare Recipients' Knowledge of Right to Appeal
Unfavourable Welfare Decision in Selected Canadian Cities
City

No Knowledge of Right to Appeal

Toronto
Hamilton
Halifax
Fredericton
Winnipeg
Regina

206 or 56% out of a sample of 366
39 or 45% out of a sample of 87
57 or 44% out of a sample of 130
69 or 75% out of a sample of 92
28 or 28% out of a sample of 99
22 or 43% out of a sample of 41

Source: Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, Welfare Practices
and Civil Liberties: A Canadian Survey (Toronto, 1975),
p. 81.

The importance of notifying claimants of their
right of appeal is particularly great since letters turning
down claims tend to be written in authoritative and
frightening technical language. Thus, a letter denying
disability benefits under the Ontario Family Benefit Act
may read as follows: 3 27
1981
Re: FBA File
Dear Mr. ......
Your request for additional assistance as a disabled person has been carefully considered. I regret to inform you
that we are unable to approve your request at this time as in
the opinion of our Medical Advisory Board you continue to
be considered permanently unemployable but are not considered disabled under Family Benefits Legislation.
While we are unable to provide the additional assistance
at present, you may be assured of every consideration if
your situation changes.
Please see the reverse side of this letter for further information pertaining to your allowance.
Yours very truly,
Director
Family Benefits

The calibre of Boards of Review is extremely low.
The decision has been made to have non-lawyers interpret a highly technical statute. The result has been
disastrous. 28 The decisions of the Boards of Review
that I have seen have often failed to identify which section of which statute is being dealt with. No reference is
made to principles and none to case law. Thus, we are
informed that a person has been found to be
"cohabitating" or has been found not to be "disabled"
but we are not told how the Board of Review reached
this conclusion.
In one case, an Ontario Court had to remand a case
back to the Social Assistance Review Board,3 29 because
the Board of Review had not stated how it reached its
conclusion; hence, judicial review was futile.
The boards often do not observe the rules of
natural justice. In Ontario, the Director receives a
report from the Medical Advisory Board and the Director will simply state that he has received a negative
report from the Medical Advisory Board and the applicant is ineligible for the particular benefit. The contents
of the Medical Advisory Board's report are not given in
evidence and the appellant has no right to see it. Some
of the documents on which the Director relies are not
even produced on appeal. No transcript is kept of the
appeal unless there is legal representation on both
146

sides.33 0 In Manitoba, the Social Services Advisory
Committee (the welfare review tribunal) had been
routinely represented in appeals before the courts. The
practice ended in the case of Beattie v. Director of
Social Services (Winnipeg South/West),"1 ' where the
appellant successfully objected to the committee's
representation. The Manitoba Court of Appeal held
that all the arguments which the committee wished to
make were contained in the factum submitted by the
respondent director and would be argued by his counsel.
In the words of the court, "it is our view that it would be
preferable for the committee not to appear in this court
to defend its decision on the merits where the committee
2
has given a decision as an impartial tribunal." 33
Although the formal links between the director and the
committee have been formally severed, welfare
claimants might well feel that the link between the director and the committee is still unhealthily close.
Legal representation might change some of the
results of excessive amateurism and informality but this
seems doubtful. In the first place, of 3,907 appeals
heard during the fiscal year ending March 31, 1980, in
Ontario, only 247 claimants were legally represented. 333
Second, even universal legal representation will make
little difference if the tribunal refuses, or is unable, to
make principled decisions. Legal representation will
also have very little effect if tribunals see themselves as
allies of the Director of Welfare, rather than impartial
adjudicators.
10. The Welfare Claimant and Abusive Behaviour
There are disturbing reports of abusive behaviour
directed against welfare claimants from all parts of
Canada. The problem of abusive behaviour is a very
serious matter because the abusive language also often
serves to deny the claimant a right.
Consider these examples given by the Canadian
Civil Liberties Education Trust:3 34
(a) A 46 year old divorced woman suffering from arthritis
and varicose veins, reported that upon refusing her choice

327. This is a copy of a letter which came to my attention in August
1981.
328. Most of the Board decisions that I have seen have been from Ontario but the non-Ontario decisions I have seen are equally cursory and unsatisfactory.
329. See the decision in Re McLeod (April 13, 1977), unreported, Ontario Divisional Court (reviewing S.A.R.B. decision No.
259895).
330. See statement by Mr. Borczak, Chairman of the Social
Assistance Review Board in Ont., Standing Committee on Social
Development, Proceedings, (October 20, 1980), p. 55.
331. Beattie v. Dir. of Soc. Services (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 156.
332. Id., p. 158.
333. See statement by Mr. Borczak, Chairman of the Social
Assistance Review Board in the Ont. Standing Committee on
Social Development, Proceedings(October 14, 1980), p. 8.
334. See Welfare Practicesand Civil Liberties, supra note 317, p. 77.
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of a main floor apartment, the welfare worker said, "We
can carry you on our backs, ha-ha."
(b) In Regina, when a crib was requested for a newly born
child, the welfare official is reported to have advised the
family to use a cardboard box.
(c) Finally, in Toronto, a 25 year old separated woman said
that her worker gave her the following advice, "You've got
an arse, go out and hustle, other women do."

In the first case, the welfare worker may, in addition to using abusive language, be depriving the claimant of her legal rights to a main floor apartment. In
the second case, the mother may have been entitled to
the crib, either under provincial welfare regulations, or
else as an item of discretionary aid. In the third case, the
welfare worker is almost certainly acting illegally. For
one thing, the mother may be unemployable because she
has young children. Second, even if she is employable
she is still entitled to welfare unless it can be shown that
she has not been making efforts at finding work.
Even where the abusive remark or behaviour does
not immediately deny the claimant a welfare benefit, the
effect of the abusive behaviour may be to discourage a
claimant from claiming a particular benefit in future.
Kuyek, Noonan and Mantha in their article on the Right
to Welfare in Ontario"' give examples of this kind of
insulting behaviour. In one case, a claimant had had difficulty in securing welfare. Eventually he was declared
eligible but the welfare administrator demanded that he
report at the welfare office three times a week at 9:00
a.m. The claimant was given no explanation for the requirement; the authors speculate that one possible explanation for this strange requirement was to punish the
claimant for having sought the assistance of third parties." 6 In another case described by the authors, Mr. X
was only paid $140 out of the $320 to which he was entitled. Mr. X was informed of his rights and he was told
to go and see the administrator. The administrator promised to pay him the difference provided he (the claimant) told no one because: "The government would be
angry if I started giving people everything they are entitled to." Despite this promise, Mr. X never received
the benefit.13 7 People who do not get what they are promised after having exhausted all the procedures could
very well refrain from claiming a benefit in the future at least if she or he can possibly live without it.
A final example of a degrading practice which could
affect people asserting their rights is the practice used by
the welfare department in British Columbia of administering lie-detector tests on welfare recipients who
claim that their welfare cheque has been stolen." A
Mr. Robert Joyce seems to have been the first person to
complain of the treatment. After his experience, Mr.
Joyce said, "I'm sure many welfare clients in a similar
bind would be scared off by it and decide not to apply
for crisis relief."3 39
Mr. Joyce's prediction seems to be coming true. In
the first six months of 1980, only one out of eight
welfare recipients asked to take the test did so. Sadly,
the welfare department regard the operation as a great
success since they claim that the number of money loss
and theft claims had gone down from 335 a month to 50
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a month.3 4 0 But if this is so, then, even on the welfare
department's evidence there is cause for concern because
in the pre-lie-detector days, the welfare department
estimated that half of the 335 reports were
fraudulent.3 4 1 If this is so, then 160 claims were valid so
that the present figure of 50 claims a month means that
at least 110 valid claims are not being recognized. It
would be, of course, considered intolerable if people
who suffered, say, insurance losses, were to be subjected to lie-detector tests. However, this degrading
behaviour passes with only sporadic criticism3 4 2 when
used against welfare claimants.

Conclusion
The war against welfare abuse is a particularly
cynical and cruel one. In the first place, by grossly exaggerating the extent of fraud and abuse that occurs,
politicians help build up a climate of opinion which
enables cut-backs to be made and which also tolerates
abusive practices towards those receiving social security
benefits. After all, if social security recipients are committing fraud and abuse on a massive scale, it is difficult
to feel compassion for them. Second, the effect of
allegations of widespread fraud may well serve to
discourage claimants from claiming benefits since they
do not wish to see themselves as belonging to a group
which has a reputation for committing fraud and
scrounging. Third, complaints about welfare abuse
serve to conceal vast areas of welfare law and administration from critical scrutiny since these areas are
never mentioned by those who allege rampant welfare
abuse.
There can be no winners in this war. People who
are abused are likely to lose respect for themselves, and
for the society in which they live. The violence that is
done to the social fabric by those who have been abused
exceeds the loss of a few million dollars taken from the
state.3 43 In the end, the cessation of the war is not only
an ethical imperative; it is also practical politics.

335. See Kuyek, Noona and Mantha, supra note 198.
336. Id., p. 110, n. 20.
337. Id., p. 119.
338. See the letter dated May 29, 1980 by Mr. Robert Joyce to the
Ombudsman complaining of the practice, quoted in The Province, May 29, 1980.
339. Id.

340. Id.
341. Id.
342. NDP M.L.A.'s Rosemary Brown and Gary Lauk expressed
criticism of the practice as did Mr. Kit Rigg, President of the
B.C. Civil Liberties Association; see The Vancouver Sun, May
29, 1980.
343. The costs of this war include for those who are disabled and
unemployed, a higher rate of mental illness and suicide, a higher
incidence of marital breakdown and worsening standards of
physical health.
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